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An Apology for Jason: A Study of Euripides' *Medea*

ROBERT B. PALMER

CRITICS OF Greek tragedy, and of Euripidean tragedy in particular, have always shown a surprising unanimity of opinion in their treatment of Jason, the fallen hero of Euripides' *Medea*. Despite the fact that most of the other Euripidean heroes have created a storm of controversy,¹ Jason seems to be perfectly understood by anyone who has the wit to read *Medea*. Is he not, after all, a clear-cut example of a crass and boundless egotist (see Bethe, Pohlenz, Wilamowitz),² a selfish ass who pleads a case to which no gentleman would care to listen (so Allen, Earle, Gilbert Murray, Page),³ and yet calloused (Blaklock)⁴ and stupid enough to believe his defense a good one (Page, again)?⁵ In short, is he not utterly detestable (Norwood)⁶ and contemptible (Bates, Kitto)?⁷

Both Bates and Norwood, however, feel a little uneasy about the type of drama they have made out of *Medea* by such a characterization of Jason.

Norwood, for example, with his fine instinct for literature, sees immediately that Euripides is writing a play which is most un-Sophoclean in tone, since Sophocles would have created the soul of his drama out of "the collision of wills and emotions" which arise "from the confrontation of two persons."⁸ In fact, "Sophocles," as Norwood goes on to say, "would probably have given us a Jason whose claim upon our sympathy was hardly less than that of Medea."

Instead, it would seem that Euripides wrote in *Medea* a rather strange play which is completely dominated by the protagonist, Medea, even though the actual *páthos* or scene of suffering seems to belong primarily to Jason. The conflict, which is so essential to all good drama, becomes then not a conflict between two philosophies of life, two prevailing attitudes, both essentially right, but, rather, a conflict between two Medeas, the one the demon witch who



A Second Century A.D. Jason-Medea Sarcophagus: a typical example of the influence Euripides' *Medea* had on Greco-Roman art. Note the dominant position of the hero. (Reproduced, by permission, from G. Rodenwaldt, *Die Kunst der Antike*, p. 640.)

thirsts for blood and vengeance, the other the tender mother whose children have become flesh of her flesh through the mystery and pain of childbirth.⁹ Such is the mastery (or perversity) of a Euripides.

Bates even goes so far as to wonder where, if anywhere, there lurks in the play the "pity" and "fear" which Aristotle suggests should be basic ingredients of Greek tragedy.¹⁰ These emotions cannot be nurtured by the characterization of Medea; to be sure. She is too ruthless and cold-blooded a murderess. Nor can they be bred by the characterization of the "cold and calculating Jason." Instead, this pity and fear so essential to drama can only be aroused by the children. "It is fear for *them* and pity for *their* fate that the poet stirs up."

With this statement Bates finds himself in the awkward position of placing the entire emphasis of the play on what he admits to be the fate of two characters "who are silent except for a word or two uttered behind the scenes." Such a conclusion does not distress him, however. On the contrary, he goes on to say that "this is a good example of the importance of the silent character in Greek tragedy, particularly in the tragedy of Euripides"! [exclamation mark mine]

It is difficult to concur with Bates' estimate of the importance of the children, but there is something in his starting point (the elements of pity and fear) that rings true. Euripides did write a play which stirred up strong emotions of pity and fear in his Athenian audience. There were few Greek dramas which could perform the function of catalytic agent as well. That the presence of the children had something to do with this flow of pity and fear seems obvious. But I must insist that the fate of the children was important only because of the effect it had on the audience as it experienced vicariously the horror of *Jason's* fate.¹¹ It is pity and fear for *Jason*, not Medea, which Euripides' audience felt as the play drew to its disastrous close, a pity and

fear triggered by the dilemma of a Jason who was far different from the Jason experienced by a 19th-or 20th-century audience.¹²

It has long been known that Euripides introduced current political and social problems into the mythology he used as the raw material for his plots. These conscious anachronisms, if they can be called that,¹³ have much to do with the basic tensions with which Euripidean plays concern themselves. And yet it is these anachronisms which are often lost in the passage of time as 5th-century B.C. standards of morality become 4th-or 3rd-century B.C. standards, or those even of the 19th or 20th century A.D. The recent sociological and political studies of Little, Thomson, Webster, Delebecque, and Zuntz¹⁴ make this quite clear, even though they may overemphasize the topological aspects of Greek drama. Certainly these studies should help us understand that the Jason and Medea we meet in Euripides are not the Jason and Medea of an earlier epic society but that their counterparts are to be found, instead, in 5th-century Athens.

Medea has always been understood in this light. Her speeches make this quite clear. She is, after all, a 5th-century woman in revolt—not, to be sure, a 5th-century Athenian *asté* or citizeness, but a *xéne*, a foreigner, who carries with her the added taint of being a *bárbaros*, a non-Greek. As a non-Greek and foreigner, she is subject to all of the stringent laws, written and unwritten, which Greek society in the form of the *pólis*, the clan, the family, has established to exclude her. Her position is a lonely one and her speeches, filled as they are with the new intellectual outlook (dare we say, the new individualistic outlook?)¹⁵ must have made a deep impression on a 5th-century Athenian audience.

But if 5th-century concepts apply to Medea, they must apply with equal force to Jason, who, though an exile, is still a Greek of noble birth with a deep-rooted relationship to the family, the clan and the phratry, and, through

them, to the city state. It is as a Greek, moreover, and not, incidentally, as a hero, that Jason's problem or dilemma arises. For Jason in *Medea* is no longer a great hero with the *areté* which makes the hero heroic, unique, alone, "above the law" as it were.¹⁶ Instead, he is characterized more as a fallen hero, "the hero that was," to use Blaiklock's fine term for him.¹⁷ He who once was a great individual who could lead the Argonauts, who could make Medea fall in love with him and desert her fatherland is now "an ordinary Greek,"¹⁸ a *graeculus* who wants little more than to crawl back into the sheltering anonymity of the Greek patriarchal system. Jason wants to be *epi-se-mos*: "stamped," "marked," "accepted in the coinage of the realm."¹⁹ Yet to be completely eligible for the anonymous immortality which the phratry can give him, he must qualify not only himself but his progeny. For, as every 5th-century Athenian citizen knew, whatever immortality a man had, he got through his children who carried on the all-important rites to the dead which perpetuated the family²⁰ and preserved for each member of that family his future identity.

Still, Jason had two children, the children of Medea. Why could they not be admitted to the *hierà kai hósia* of the phratry and carry on the family name? The truth seems to be that Jason's children were *nóthoi* or bastards.

Under the Periclean law of 451/450 B.C.,²¹ not only was Athenian citizenship limited to children of Athenian citizens, but children of a mixed marriage (i.e. a marriage between an Athenian citizen and a *xéne*) were illegitimate (*nóthoi*) unless the right of marriage had been extended to the city state from which the *xéne* came. That the children of Jason, a Greek, and of Medea, a *xéne* and a barbarian to boot, could not become citizens is tragic enough, but that they were *nóthoi* is what lies at the heart of the matter. Pollux' definition of *nóthos* (3. 21) is clear enough: "a bastard is a child

born of a *xéne* or of a concubine."

There are, however, other reasons why Jason's children qualify as bastards. Kurt Latte, in his article in *RE* on bastardy, establishes three qualifications under which children became stigmatized as bastards: (1) they are children born out of wedlock or children born to parents one of whom is not free; (2) they are the offspring of a citizen and a non-citizen; (3) they are the fruit of an adulterous union. Jason's children by Medea therefore could be bastards for two reasons: (1) they are the offspring of a "citizen"²² and a *xéne*; their mother's marriage does not fulfill the qualifications set up for a legal marriage, i.e. a marriage carried out with *engúe*²³ or *ékdosis*.²⁴ Medea, in short, is not a *gunê gametê* or *enguetê*—"a solemnly married wife."²⁵

For the legitimate acts of *engúe* and *ékdosis*, a *kúrios* (father or guardian) was needed. Medea had eliminated any guardian she might have had when she proved to be the cause of the death of her father and brother. She is not unaware of this lack of kinship ties when she mentions in lines 257-58 her lack of mother or brother or any relative with whom she can take refuge in "this sea of woe."²⁶ Finally, there is good reason to believe that there was no formal dowry, no *phernê* or *proix*, which came with Medea.²⁷ In short, legally speaking, Medea could only have been a *pallakê*, a term used to denote any woman who lived with a man without being his wife through *engúe* and *ékdosis* or through *epidikasia*.²⁸ We would call her today a common-law wife—the product of an unwritten marriage which had legal force, to be sure, but had tragic implications for Jason, once he had lost his nerve.

This does not mean Medea accepts her position. In fact, one could almost say that much of the play concerns itself with her fight to maintain herself as the only mate Jason shall ever have. Here a study of the terminology used by the pro- and anti-Medea factions proves helpful. Significantly

enough, everyone on Medea's side, save for one interesting exception, belongs to one of the oppressed classes: the nurse, the *paidagōgós* (both slaves), the chorus (Corinthian women).²⁹ The exception, of course, is the supposedly neutral Aegeus, who is cast as a *kalòs k'agathós*, an Athenian gentleman, surprisingly free from the normal prejudices which beset most rulers, or most humans, in fact.³⁰ The anti-Medea faction contains Creon, his daughter, and, in varying degrees, Jason.

From the very first, the pro-Medea faction employs terms which point up what it believes to be a husband-wife relationship between Jason and Medea. The terms *álochos*, *gunē*, *eunē*, *léchos*, *númphe*, *pósis*, all allude to this.³¹ Most stressed by Medea, however, is the oath Jason gave to her when he took her from her native land—that he would remain true to her. In her famous speech on the fate of the *gunē* (230-66), Medea even conjures up the word *apallagē* (236)³² "divorce," and the concept of the dowry or *phernē* when she talks of buying a husband (233).

Yet for all of this, it is Medea, too, who at times gives us a hint of what her true position is in Greek society. In line 256 she mentions that she was carried off as booty from a barbarian land (something which could only happen to someone now a *pallakē* or concubine) while in line 591 she mentions that Jason seems to look upon her as a barbarian *léchos* who will bring him little respectability in his present position. But most striking of all is Medea's terminology when she speaks of Jason's new marriage. It is she who points up the fact that Creon gave his daughter to Jason through *ékdoxis*.³³ It is she who bewails the fact that she has no family and has therefore entered into a relationship from which there is no escape (255-58).

Jason, on the other hand, admits he is bound to her (1336), admits her children are his children (1337),³⁴ but adds also that this was a marriage with no Greek woman but a barbarian—a

barbarian who acts as no Greek woman could (1329-32; 1339-40). As for Creon, all the terms he uses for Medea (calling her *gunē* [290, 337], talking of Jason as her *pósis* [271] and mentioning her *léktron* [286]) are those which could be applied to any common-law wife or concubine.³⁵ Certainly there seems to be no question in his mind that what Jason is doing is perfectly legal—perfectly within the rights of any Greek who has lived out the years of his youth with a barbarian. Perhaps because Medea is a stranger and a non-Greek, Creon fears her, knowing instinctively that her reactions will have to be those of the Greek common-law wife who must suffer in silence. And so he must banish her.

To argue *ex silentio* that no one calls Medea *dámar* (the one term for "legally wedded wife" Euripides seems to use with any consistency)³⁶ is probably reading too much into the text,³⁷ but it is, nevertheless, interesting to note that the terms used for Medea throughout the play never argue conclusively for her position as a *gunē gametēs*, a woman given to her husband by her *kúrios*, a woman who comes to her marriage accompanied by the safeguards of the *phernē* and the written and unwritten laws of the phratry and the *pólis*.

If then Jason's children are bastards, they cannot be admitted to the *heirá kai hósia* nor can they be enrolled in the phratry by their father as he swears his solemn oath before the altar of Zeus.³⁸ Without this formal ceremony the children cannot inherit, nor, worse still for Jason, can they carry out the sacred rites of the family religion—those rites which perpetuate the continuity of the family. Jason's immortality—his anonymous immortality which only the kinship group can grant him—is imperiled unless he can formally marry a Greek citizen, an *astē* from whom he can father a legitimate son, a son born *ex astēs kai enquetēs*.³⁹ Only such a son can perpetuate the family name, the family immortality.

Is it then so strange to find Jason doing what Isaeus (7. 30) suggests each

man should do when he reaches the end of the family line, i.e. "to take measures of precaution on (his) own behalf to preserve (his) family from becoming extinct and to secure that there should be someone to perform sacrifices and carry out the customary rites over him"?⁴⁰ And should we not take Jason's speech (547 ff.) on the advantages to be gained from a marriage with Creon's daughter quite seriously as an honest expression of what any beleaguered Greek male would say in his place?⁴¹

An awareness of Jason's dilemma, moreover, helps resolve some of the vexing problems which have harassed past editors of *Medea*. Allen, for example, has asked, logically enough, why Jason is so indifferent to the children in the beginning of the play (76 ff.),⁴² why he allows them to go with Medea at first, and why later (562 ff.; 914 ff.) he becomes so involved in their fate. Yet, as we have seen, in the beginning Jason is concerned primarily with the problem of a legitimate son, and we know from a study of Athenian law that illegitimate children are not the responsibility of the father but go with the mother wherever she goes.⁴³ Actually, from a legal standpoint there are no demands the father can make of such children. They are the children of the mother since, as Erdmann says, no child can be a bastard of his mother. It was only natural, therefore, that the children go with Medea.

Yet Medea knows her husband well. Plotting carefully, she decides to strip Jason of any chance of ever having a child legally again. So she brings about the holocaust in Creon's palace to which Creon and his daughter fall victim. As long as the memory of this terrible act remains, it is doubtful that Jason will ever be able to contract another marriage legally—certainly not as long as Medea is alive to remind any prospective *kúrios* of the fate of his predecessor, Creon. In fact, this may be one reason why she must escape to Athens and stay alive.⁴⁴ With her murder of Creon and his daughter, Medea has

stripped Jason of his only hope for immortality in Greek society.

But there is one other immortality he has—the immortality which lives on in his own children. Illegitimate though they are, there is something of Jason in both of them—something which will live on unless it is killed. It is here that Medea administers her master stroke. Knowing that Jason has one last hope of preserving his identity, his own children, she decides to kill them, too.

The tragedy has come full circle. Not only has Jason been stripped of his last opportunity to preserve his name but now he has been stripped of his last ties with the race of men to come. Small wonder he is at the end of the play a broken man who is to dream out his last days under the prow of the Argo which is to bring him oblivion (1386-88).

With Jason's tragedy a little better understood, he becomes a character a little less contemptible, while his speeches, despicable though they are in many respects, become more tragic and less shallow in their import. To Jason, we must remember, Greece is an enlightened haven of security, the marriage he contemplated *would* have brought help to his illegitimate children and, incidentally, some help to Medea. His "selfishness" now becomes a little less incomprehensible. True, there is little excuse for the way he treats Medea personally. But in everything he says about his children he is sincere. He is not marrying Creon's daughter because she is young, he rightfully rejects Medea's attempts to reduce the whole incident to a sexual level. It may, in fact, be this very attitude of hers in the past which brings on his brutal statements about physical love and its electricity. Exhausted as he is by his strenuous life with its attendant dangers, he has been cast by Euripides as a bourgeois hero with a bourgeois sense of morality. That he is no real match for Medea is true. But that his tragedy, his impossible position in society have made him into a

fellow human being who can arouse pity and fear in a 5th-century Athenian, I do not doubt. As such a character he raises the drama *Medea* to a level much closer to that of another of the earlier plays of Euripides, *Hippolytus*, in which the action line comes from a strong conflict between two strong individuals.

The innovation made in plot by Euripides is then not so drastic, after all. Instead of a play which develops its conflict within the soul of the protagonist alone, we have a social drama of harsh realism in which the revenge motif is carried to its grim conclusion in a turbulent atmosphere of middle-aged frustration and despair.⁴⁵ Is this not innovation enough?

Scripps College

NOTES

¹ Interestingly enough, the heroes are often less well understood than the heroines. Consider the controversy which rages over Herakles, Hippolytus, even Pentheus. E. M. Blaklock, *The Male Characters of Euripides* (Wellington, 1950) p. xv would probably attribute this confusion to the failure of many critics to realize that Euripides' male characters are treated more realistically than romantically.

² E. Bethe, *Medea-Probleme*, Sächs. S. B. 70 (Leipzig, 1918) p. 14; M. Pohlenz, *Die Griechische Tragödie*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1954) p. 254; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Griechische Tragödien*, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1906) p. 181.

³ F. D. Allen and C. R. Moore, *The Medea of Euripides* (Boston, 1900) p. xxvi; M. L. Earle, *The Medea of Euripides* (New York, 1904) p. 46; G. Murray, *Euripides and His Age* (New York, 1947) p. 65; D. Page, *Euripides' Medea* (Oxford, 1952) pp. xv-xvi.

⁴ Blaklock (see note 1) p. 28.

⁵ Page (see note 3).

⁶ G. Norwood, *Greek Tragedy* (Boston, 1920) p. 196.

⁷ W. N. Bates, *Euripides, A Student of Human Nature* (Philadelphia, 1930) p. 165; H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study* (Anchor Book A38, Garden City, 1954) pp. 199, 206. Kitto actually calls him an "unrelieved villain," a man in whom "it is impossible to find anything that is not mean." G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London, 1941) p. 154 is a little more kind when he points out that Jason is brought on stage after our sympathy for Medea is somewhat shaken.

⁸ Norwood (see note 6) p. 196.

⁹ For this concept of conflict, see M. Pohlenz (note 2) p. 258: "Hier erwächst die ganze Handlung aus dem innersten Wesen Medeas." See also Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*, part 1, vol. 3 (Munich, 1940) p. 369; A. Lesky, *Die Griechische Tragödie* (Stuttgart, 1936) p. 148.

¹⁰ Bates (see note 7) p. 166; the following quota-

tions are also to be found here. Apparently to Bates, Greek tragedy must produce pity and fear if it is to be good Greek tragedy. That good Greek tragedy can and does arouse other emotions, and that it sometimes arouses these emotions without purging them is never discussed. I feel sure *Medea* is such a play.

¹¹ This is not to say that *Medea* is not in the beginning of the play an object of pity and fear. But her revenge is so diabolically perfect, her metamorphosis into a demon so complete by the end of the play that the audience is left with a feeling of utter frustration mingled with horror and disgust. Unlike *Hecuba* in *Hecuba*, *Medea* is not touched with the saving grace of insanity.

¹² It must be obvious to anyone who gives any thought to the problem that the concepts of morality which modern critics bring to the play are, of necessity, quite different from the concepts brought to the play by a 5th-century B.C. Athenian audience. Fifth-century B.C. society is not 20th-century society—far from it. It is for this reason that a sociological study of Jason's dilemma must be made before we can appreciate fully the play Euripides wrote.

¹³ To call them anachronisms is somehow to miss the point. An anachronism is usually thought of as an error in time. Greek tragedians knew exactly what they were doing when they re-wrote their mythology in 5th-century terms. In fact, their choice of myth was obviously affected by the reaction the playwrights knew they could get out of their audience. What better example is there of this than Aeschylus' *Oresteia* in which 5th-century kinship problems in evolution are given concrete form through the *Orestes* myth?

¹⁴ A. M. G. Little, *Myth and Society in Attic Drama* (New York, 1940); G. D. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens* (London, 1941); T. B. L. Webster, *Political Interpretations in Greek Literature* (Manchester, 1948); E. Delebecque, *Euripide et la guerre du Péloponnèse* (Paris, 1951). For an antidote to Delebecque, see G. Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides* (Manchester, 1955).

¹⁵ Pohlenz (see note 2) p. 265 and B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) p. 125, would agree. W. Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides* (Basel, 1947) pp. 69-72, definitely would not.

¹⁶ I am influenced here by Jaeger's concept of *areté* in *Paideia*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1954) pp. 3-14 and the brilliant use which has been made of it by C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

¹⁷ Blaklock (see note 1) pp. 21-35.

¹⁸ So Grube (see note 7) p. 147.

¹⁹ *Medea* 544; the term is usually translated as "distinguished." See, for example, Rex Warner, *The Medea in Euripides*, edd. D. Grene and R. Lattimore (Chicago, 1955) p. 78. Yet Jason is suggesting that he would rather give up wealth and the power to sing sweet songs like Orpheus for a *tücher epise-mos*. Can this not mean, as Liddell and Scott suggest, "stamped," or "coined," i.e. "having a mint mark on it"? See M. L. Earle (note 3) p. 147.

²⁰ On this, see still N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, trans. W. Small (Anchor Book A76, Garden City, 1956) pp. 48-53.

²¹ The legal discussion which follows is based for the most part on the following accounts: J. H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*,

vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1912) pp. 471-86; W. Erdmann, *Die Ehe im alten Griechenland* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrussforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte 20; Munich, 1934) *passim*; H. J. Wolff, "Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens. A Study on the Interrelation of Public and Private Law in the Greek City," *Traditio* 2 (1944) 43-85; O. Schultze, *RE*, vol. 19, s.v. *pherné*, cols. 2040-52; K. Latte, *RE*, vol. 17, s.v. *nóthos*, cols. 1066-74; Erdmann, *RE*, vol. 18, s.v. *patiké*, cols. 226-29. Blakelock (see note 1) p. 21, following L. M. Mead's lead in her article, "A Study in the Medea," *Greece and Rome* 12 (1943) 15-20, mentions the Periclean law and suggests its effect on Medea. Neither Mead nor Blakelock makes Jason's dilemma clear, however.

²² I think it is fair to say a 5th-century Athenian might well identify Jason with his own position in society. Surely it is this type of projection which Euripides uses constantly in his characterization of Medea.

²³ By *engûe* is meant, of course, the betrothal, the solemn moment when the *kúrios* (the father or guardian) "hands over" or "entrusts" (*engûdw*) the bride to the groom, who accepts the trust. It was "a preliminary act to a future marriage." See Wolff (note 21) p. 51-53.

²⁴ By *ékodos* is meant the formal conveyance of the bride to the home of the husband, similar to the Roman *in domum deductio*. This followed immediately or some time after *engûe*-sis. For the interesting legal relationship between *engûe* and *ékodos*, see Wolff (note 21) p. 48-53.

²⁵ For this equation *gunê gametê* = *gunê enguetê*, see Wolff (note 21) p. 68. G. Murray has suggested that Medea and Jason were not legally married; see *Five Plays by Euripides* (New York, 1934) pp. vii, viii, 81.

²⁶ I have adapted Rex Warner's translation (see note 19) p. 67.

²⁷ Whether the fatal gifts to Creon's daughter could be considered part of Medea's *proix* is hard to determine. She does suggest them as *tdsde phernês* (856), but it would seem she means by this Creon's daughter's *phernê*, not hers.

²⁸ The definition is Wolff's (see note 21) p. 73.

²⁹ It is interesting to note that the chorus pleads always as women *qua* women rather than as Corinthian women or as Greek women. If one keeps this fact in mind, it is easier to understand why the chorus does little to stand in the way of Medea's revenge.

³⁰ This does not keep him from being perfect grist for Medea's mill, however. She uses him the way she does every male in the play.

³¹ The terminology used of Tecmessa, the concubine in Sophocles' *Ajax*, points up the fact that *léchos* (Aj. 211, 491); *númphe* (894); *eunê* (403); *gunê* (1160 et *passim*) are all terms which can be used of a close but non-legal bond between a man and his mistress. So, too, *dióchos* (cf. Il. 9. 336; Od. 4. 623, and the article by W. P. Clark, "Iliad 9. 336 and the Meaning of *dióchos* in Homer," *CP* 35 [1940] 188-90); and *pósis* (cf. Il. 24. 725; *Orestes* 561).

³² Not the legal term (but cf. *Andr.* 592) which is *apóleipsis* (i.e. a divorce where the woman leaves of her own accord). See Erdmann (note 21) p. 396.

³³ See *Medea* 262, 300-10. In the second case the word *ekdidonai*, i.e. the technical term for "to give in marriage" is used. Is it not significant,

moreover, that Euripides never has Medea, or the chorus, or the nurse allude to the element in the myth which talks of a marriage in the cave of Macræ? See *Ap. Rh.* 4. 1128-69.

³⁴ Jason even admits he has enough children and that he finds no fault with those he has (558). This is true as far as it goes, for another child by Medea will solve nothing nor can anything be done to improve the status of the children he and Medea already have. Jason's only solution can come from another marriage which can bring him a different kind of child—a legitimate son who can help the children he already has.

³⁵ See note 31.

³⁶ The term is used once in the play when Medea speaks of Aegeus' wife (672). Even the most casual reader of Alcestis is impressed by the force of *dámar*, the word most often used for Alcestis' solemn relationship to her husband. See the list of citations in J. T. Allen and G. Italie, *A Concordance to Euripides* (Berkeley, 1934) p. 136.

³⁷ There is a strange line in the Aegeus episode which seems to point to Medea's preoccupation with legitimate and illegitimate children. Why does she ask Aegeus in 672, after she has asked him about his childlessness: "This with a wife or knowing not the couch?" i.e. married legally or not married? Does this not mean, "Are you childless because your legitimate wife produces no children for you, or are you childless because you are sterile and can produce no children, wife or no"? Let us remember, too, Aegeus' child proved to be Theseus, an illegitimate child, illegitimate because Aegeus "loosed the hanging foot of the wine skin" (679) before he returned to Athens.

³⁸ The ceremony is described in detail by Erdmann (see note 21) p. 347-48.

³⁹ Is. 8. 19.

⁴⁰ The translation is slightly adapted from F. S. Forster's in the Loeb Library (London, 1927).

⁴¹ I do not wish to depreciate here the feeling of disgust which anyone experiencing Medea feels when Jason argues in his maddeningly logical and sophisticated way against the normal decencies he owes Medea as a woman, or even as a member of the human race. But I do wish to stress the different reaction an Athenian male, a product of the 5th-century patriarchal system of kinship, would have had to this speech and Jason's character in general.

⁴² Allen (see note 3) p. xxv. The question has been asked before; see Bethe (note 2) p. 14.

⁴³ Erdmann (see note 21) pp. 371-75.

⁴⁴ May this not be one reason, too, why Creon must die? Allen (see note 3) p. xxv, had asked why Jason did not marry again and have other children. I think my suggestion answers the question. It also helps explain the Aegeus scene and Medea's need for a haven. Does it not solve Bethe's dilemma (see note 2) p. 7?

⁴⁵ I am always struck by the fact that one thinks inevitably of Ibsen and Strindberg when one reads *Medea* rather than of even so Euripidean a drama as Sophocles' *Trachiniae*. In short, the line of cleavage between the Sophoclean and Euripidean approaches to psychology and sociology is greater than one would like to think, but in dramatic technique (at least in the case of the earlier Euripidean dramas) the two dramatists do not differ as much as one might expect.

THE FORUM

MARGARET M. FORBES, EDITOR

Our readers will, we hope, engage in cheerful controversy after being stimulated to thoughtful comment by the first two papers in this month's FORUM. Both writers are concerned with the problem of teaching some form of Latin as a spoken language, although their conclusions are at variance. (Professor Pulgram's report on the Avignon Conference, *CJ* 52 [1957] 301-308, might be reread as a basis for discussion.)

WHAT USE LATIN?

GOODWIN BEACH

[Excerpts from a paper read at the Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, April, 1957.]

Not long since, when I was introduced to a Cuban, newly appointed to a Board of Directors, our mutual friend remarked on my love of Latin. "Ah," said the Cuban, "I don't know how you feel about it in this country, but we in Latin America know that when a man is proficient in Latin, he is well educated." Another friend, when he was in Europe this past summer, mentioned me as being fluent in Latin speech. His friend countered: "An American? It can't be so."

Now I mention this, not in order to vaunt any prowess that I may have, but simply to show the high regard in which Latin is held in other parts, and to show the low regard in which our scholarship, our culture is held. The former surprises no classicist; the other is a cause for shame.

The point is this: our country has attained pre-eminence in the world. The rest of the world considers us rich and also generous. They acknowledge our accomplishments in technology. Yet they are dubious whether we know enough history, have enough knowledge of other peoples, their literature, their traditions and aspirations—in short, are wise enough to guide the world in the political field.

The sooner we divest ourselves of this reputation of being culturally deficient, the better. I, therefore, set it down as a patriotic duty for Americans in general, and educators in particular, to note this and to set about repairing the damage forthwith.

Last summer when I was abroad, I was chagrined to note that hardly any Amer-

icans had a smattering of a foreign language. (Fifty years ago almost all Americans who went abroad knew some German and some French, with perhaps even a little Italian.) I encountered in Rome two American women who had traveled through France, knowing neither the French language nor French history; through Italy knowing neither the Italian language nor Italian or Roman history. They could not understand their guide's English. They had cast their eyes, but what they had seen they knew not. In Rome, destined to stay for some time, they were in tears: "What was there to see?" In Rome, imagine! No idea what to see. They had done better to stay at home or at most to visit the British where they might have understood the English there spoken.

Yet some will say, "Oh, well, all those people know English. You can get along anywhere with English"—generally true. But still we are left with the evidence of our own intellectual laziness, of self-satisfaction, of our having gone astray in the philosophy of education, and what is perhaps worse, we are open to the charge of arrogance. Arrogance has never won friends. In order to maintain our pre-eminent position won by weight of arms, and to help maintain the peace so hardly won, and to fend off Communism, we need and wish friends. I insist ~~that~~ it is a patriotic duty to be well educated. To be well educated means knowing languages, literatures, history. Yes, patriotic to be well educated, for we must remember that each person going abroad becomes an ambassador of good will or ill will, and that the individual private traveler has in the aggregate a greater impact on the people of other countries than has the official ambassador who usually deals only with the official world.

All right, is often the answer, but what has that to do with Latin? Nobody speaks it. Who'd understand you? That rebuttal is far from the truth, as we shall see. To the question, "But can one get around with Latin?" I answer, "Yes, unequivocally, providing that, like Erasmus, one have a smattering of the vernaculars for talking to waiters and for the heterogeneous travel services." On the steamer and elsewhere, if I had to deal with patently educated peo-

ple, I always began in their language: "I don't speak your language well, but if you speak Latin . . ."

Well, they usually did, but the look of surprise on their faces bore no high compliment for America. When I was in Italy, I stayed three days with different friends. To paraphrase Chaucer: "There was but little English in their maw, nor in mine enough Italian for conversation." We therefore spoke nothing but Latin, and since it was our common tongue, happily we could not fall therefrom into a modern idiom. The language served adequately. There was nothing we could not say, and we talked about everything, dictatorships, incidents of travel, education, etc., etc.

Latin is not a dead language, for anything can be said in it; and who will maintain that a language in which anything can be said is dead? What is dead, or, at least, apart from reality, is the pedagogy. So if Latin is to be used, then the pedagogy must be reformed. Erasmus, in whose day Latin was taught for use, prescribes Terence for speech which is terse, pure, and closest to daily speech. Cicero's is too—in his letters. The usual colloquial locutions must be learned and the words that are usually needed in daily intercourse with our fellows. We must forego the pedantry that confines the study of the language to a mere 100-year period out of a literary history of over 2000 years, on the plea that the best Latin was then written. Written, yes, but spoken? Does anyone seriously imagine that Cicero habitually spoke as he spoke in his orations? Absurd! Read his letters to his friends!

Now I in no wise wish to detract from the beauty and power of Cicero's orations, but we do not find there the language of daily life, any more than in Edmund Burke's speeches; nor do we find it in Caesar's *Commentaries*. We must use words that in such writings they did not use, when we speak of things they did not mention, or did not know. We should have trouble in English if we tried to confine ourselves to Milton's, Dryden's, Pope's, Shakespeare's vocabulary, or think that we must use periphrases to avoid new words. Unthinkable! We can attain the goal of a command of good Latin speech with interesting subject matter, adapted to the pupils' ages and interests—simple, straightforward, thorough grammar, forgetting rhetorical adornments and figures, holding all such in abeyance for those who wish to go into the higher branches.

For instance, Composition: Cicero says,

Nulla res tantum ad dicendum proficit quam scriptio (Brut. 24). That requires the right use of words. To that end we must not use the wrong word in order to keep within prescribed declensions or conjugations. The latter should be taught horizontally. Have they not the same personal endings, and are these not the same for all tenses, except the perfect? Don't all have the same forms to indicate the respective tenses, except the future? In declensions the essential meaning of the cases is important. Correct pronunciation and attention to quantities is likewise important. For there is a world of difference in the meaning of "canis" and "cānis"; between "malus" and "mālus"; full attention should be given to these points.

There is another point and that is vocabulary. As Cicero says, nothing has a name until it is invented; then it must have a name, either new or transferred. How many of you remember the popular struggle to give the motor car an acceptable name? At Avignon the decision was that a suitable word from Latin should be sought; failing that, the ready font of Greek words so often used by the Romans themselves; third choice would be the Latinizing of a popular contemporary word in such a way as to preserve the color and genius of the Latin tongue.

There are good dictionaries of modern Latin words—that by Msgr. Bacci, Papal Secretary, which the Congress wishes to see amplified, and a smaller dictionary issued in Spain by the editors of *Palaestra*, called *Nova et Vetera*.

One of the most important things: the language must be alive to the teachers, who should be able to write simple, idiomatic Latin; should be able to carry on a simple conversation, and know the terms needed and used in daily life. The class should frequently hear sentences in Latin. Praise and reprimands should be given in Latin. In short, the study of Latin should not be confined to the ocular but become lingual and aural.

If we can't find such teachers, then with their good will we can form them. Practice is needed, of course, and many with practice would soon do very well. Furthermore the Latin workshops and summer schools available all over the country could introduce courses in Latin speech. I strongly urge the institution of such courses.

As to reading matter, we must do away with drivel. Who cares to read about girls loving their dolls, or Virginia and her

doves—because they are the first declension? We must do away with matter alien to the children's interest, viz. Caesar's *Commentaries*. Peckett and Munday in *Pseudolus Noster* have amusing tales of his chicaneries. There are *Pinoculus*, *Gesta Romanorum* (whose bad Latin can be redacted into good), Phaedrus and others. Much of this material can be found in Professor Paoli's *Primus Liber*.

The Congress at Avignon resolved:

On Grammar: that the essentials of grammar be thoroughly learned, the conjugations and declensions, uses of cases, tenses, moods, etc., which lead to precision of speech; that the rhetorical adornments not be forced upon those who wish the language for simple use.

On Pronunciation: that the restored pronunciation be used, but that close attention should be paid to correct pronunciation; and that there should be regular recitation and correction. On the formation of new words and pedagogy I have already spoken.

Now we have an opportunity not open to us for years, since according to all reports, more students than ever wish to take Latin. Add to this the cry from big industry for young men developed in the Liberal Arts, not in technical subjects alone. If we take advantage of these two boons, make the subject alive, interesting, instructive, laying emphasis on the point that Latin is alive, is useful; that it is patriotic to be well educated, and that Latin is the basis of a sound education, we can expect miracles. For Latin is alive, and it will become more alive if the stir created in Europe by this Congress means anything. Therefore we must make this known in America, lest America fall behind. America, Wake Up! *Sursum Corda!*

Trinity College

INTERLINGUA

DOROTHY DEY

Having received by April *Classical Journal*, I thumbed through it as usual and found myself pausing to read carefully the article by Miss Hughes on seventh-grade Latin and Mr. Pulgram's report of the Avignon Conference—two things I have been much interested in. And first, I would like to give Mr. Pulgram a twenty-one gun salute for expressing so well what Latin is and isn't. From the time I first heard about it, I felt very doubtful about "Living Latin" as planned for the Avignon Conference.

Which leads me directly to the problem

of Latin for the elementary and intermediate school. It seems to me that there is a great deal of truth in the old saying about building a better mousetrap. Likewise I feel sure that people do not buy nylon because it is like rayon, but because it is different from rayon. On the same basis, the more I read and study about the problem of Latin for younger students, the more I become distressed at seeing Latin teachers attempt to compete with modern-language teachers by imitating and artificially reorganizing the Latin of older students after the fashion of elementary modern-language courses.

I would in no way belittle the results accomplished at the University School (Bloomington, Indiana) in seventh-grade Latin. I was much impressed by the work involved and by what must have been accomplished by that particular teacher in that particular setting. But what about all the other little and big schools all over the United States? Would their Latin teachers have the time, the ability, and the opportunity to develop such a course? And if, at the end of the course, seventh graders know no "accusative, ablative, indicative, or dative," know only the first-declension nouns and present and imperfect tenses—did they really study Latin? And finally—the problem we have never been able to solve here—when students do take Latin or modern language in the seventh grade, what does one do with them in the ninth grade?

On the other hand, for the third year now in my Latin classes, I have been using *Interlingua*¹ as supplementary work—entirely an extra-credit project (except for a two weeks' experiment carried on last year at my superintendent's request). I stumbled on the idea quite by accident. I have been amazed at the results. Nothing I have ever done—Latin plays, Roman banquet, mythology notebooks, et cetera, et cetera—has aroused the interest, gained the favorable publicity, and seemed so worthwhile for the students. Perhaps I am mistaken, but my experience with it leads me to believe that *Interlingua* is living Latin, a living Latin that actually works.

And the more I study the problem, the more I think *Interlingua* could offer the solution for the present dilemma. Dr. Gode and Watson Davis have been much interested in the possibilities and have helped me develop my ideas. It seems to me that a seventh-grade course in *Interlingua* has the following possibilities:

1. One could teach the basic rules of grammar which children that age need so

badly and find so difficult in their English classes.

2. One could teach or re-teach phonetics, both sounds used in English and in Latin and the other European languages; the great vowel shift.
3. One could quickly get children reading something they enjoy, and at the same time they would be learning the root words of Latin and modern foreign languages.
4. One would be giving them real experience with a second language that would be a foundation but in no way interfere with the courses in Latin and modern language they would take later.
5. Interlingua is something any Latin teacher can easily do; it has the backing of Science Service and the growing interest in the importance of science study for teen-agers; also many Rotarians are very interested in its possibilities and might lend their support to its development in local schools. Likewise it offers no competition with any other language course. Taught in the seventh grade, it would help every English, Latin, and modern-language teacher the children would meet later. I know the modern-language teachers are interested in Interlingua. Dr. Gode sent me a copy of the paper he presented at the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association in Washington D.C. last December. Finally since Interlingua is the antithesis of Esperanto and has nothing to do with Esperanto, one would not get entangled in those problems.

Like Mr. Pulgram, "I know Latin. I love Latin. I teach Latin." And I believe in Latin—but not taught like a seventh-grade modern-language course merely to compete with other seventh-grade language courses. I would prefer to sell nylon rather than rayon dyed a different color.

Of course, I know I am not capable of judging and I could be very wrong, but after my experience with Interlingua, I find myself sincerely believing that the Latin teachers of this generation all over the United States are going to miss their golden opportunity if they do not investigate Interlingua as a possible solution of the growing demand for junior-high foreign language.

Wellington High School,
Kansas

NOTE

¹ Information about Interlingua is available from Dr. Alexander Gode, Science Service, Interlingua Division, 80 East 11th Street, New York 3, N.Y.

TO LEARN HOW MUCH YOUR STUDENTS KNOW

STERLING DOW

The generations of students differ, the teachers get older, there is a perpetual need for the teachers to learn about their students.

One way to do this is for the teachers to give the students short quizzes on relevant information, especially at the beginning of a course. It seems to me too little of this is done.¹ We should not set about teaching, not in these times of change, without learning how much of a foundation there is to build on.

Merely to stimulate better things, I offer one such quiz. It is brief, and it deals with a few important historical facts (however arbitrarily selected); more I do not claim:

"Arrange in chronological order; give exact dates as nearly as you can, or centuries; if any overlap, put side-by-side: Jesus Christ, St. Augustine, the Emperor Augustus, Perikles, Alexander the Great."

The students were asked merely to put their class numerals on the paper. Of course no grades were given. "Jokers" are of course a danger, but all the answers appeared to be serious.

Many other varieties of quiz can be imagined, and many better. On the other hand, no apology is needed for asking about chronology. Chronology determines relationships, and relationships are important.²

The present purpose being to encourage teachers to learn more about the state of their students' knowledge, no full report of the results of this quiz would be of interest. Nevertheless it would be interesting to be told from time to time what other teachers find out. The impulse for the present quiz, for instance, was given by some helpful comments made by Professor Horace Rigg of Western Reserve College.

The quiz was taken by one class consisting of 34 Harvard students and 12 Radcliffe, both these groups being distributed over all four years and including 9 graduate students. The students' backgrounds and schooling were widely varied. Out of the total of 46 students, 19 were able to put all six persons in correct order, whereas 7 were wildly astray. The remaining 20 on the whole made creditable showings. When it came to absolute dates, however, no student had all the precise years correct; only three were able to assign all six persons to the correct centuries.

In short, no morbid "quiz kids" were in evidence, the worst answers were abysmal,

and the result as a whole was by no means as bad as might have been feared. Of course this is only a straw in the wind: to establish any general conclusion about education in the USA at the present time, at least a hundred times as many quizzes should be given. The object was rather to tell the teacher something about his class which he needed to know. I hope we can hear about other classes. The present vogue of almost-pointless TV quizzes could be utilized for good things.

Harvard University

NOTES

¹ Some years ago I recall reading about an information quiz sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation in 40 colleges of Pennsylvania. It was given to freshmen and to seniors. It purported to show that undergraduates generally don't learn much. The quiz may have been well-considered on the whole, and the result true, but at least one question, about slavery in Classical Greece, was marked so that a correct answer was counted as wrong, and a wrong answer as correct, thus anticipating the same error (not the only one) made by our own General Educators.

² Progressive education, of course, is no friend to dates, and most college teachers have come to feel that dates are as completely neglected nowadays as they were overemphasized when we learned in grammar school the exact dates of four French-and-Indian Wars (I can give them all now, but it was not for years that they had any meaning whatever—in relation, of course, to events in Europe, as parts of a long struggle for domination between France and England).

TEACHERS EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Are Latin teachers in general acquainted with the Teachers Exchange Program under the International Educational Exchange Program? Full information can be obtained from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Division of International Education, Washington 25, D.C.

The announcement in their pamphlet "Teacher Exchange Opportunities 1957-58" reads in part: "Twenty grants are announced for secondary teachers and college instructors of Latin and the classics to attend a 7-week summer seminar sponsored in cooperation with the American Academy in Rome. . . . Preference will be given to teachers between 25 and 45 years of age who have never been to Italy. . . . The grant, under the provisions of the Fulbright Act, includes tuition, round trip tourist class ocean transportation, and travel in Italy in connection with the program. Teachers will be responsible for the cost of living expenses for 7 weeks in Italy, estimated at \$400 to \$500." Included is "a

week in the Naples archaeological area under the auspices of the Vergilian Society at Cumae."

Save this announcement for next year, since it is too late to apply for 1958, the deadline being 15 October, 1957.

(Dr. Janice Cordray of Sweet Briar College is one of the classicists who recently participated in this program.)

IN DEFENSE OF LATIN

The May 1957 issue of *The Italian Scene* (Cultural Division of the Italian Embassy) presents an article as titled above.

"Don't give me all that *Latinorum*," says Renzo to Don Abbondio in the "Promessi Sposi." "*Latinorum*" is a playfully erroneous term by which Italians mean anything pompous, difficult, and couched in Latin.

Recently there has been some authoritative talk of curtailing the amount of Latin taught in Italy's schools. A hubbub has ensued, with practically everyone airing his views on education in general, and on Latin in particular.

"*Latinorum*" is now the title of a book published by Longanesi in Milan and written by an unidentified Michele Fornaciari. Knowledgeable readers, delighted by its witty and persuasive defense of Latin in education and by its sly sarcasm against recently proposed pedagogical innovations (abolition of home work, of oral and/or written exams, of grading, etc.) are convinced that "*Latinorum*" comes from the pen of Giovanni Ansaldo. In addition to his own books and articles, Ansaldo has, in fact, published under pseudonyms before. (Shortly after the war he signed with a flippant "Willy Farnese" a book of etiquette, "*Il Vero Signor*," in which serious and useful chapters deal with "how to behave in prison," "... on your day of execution," "... on your deathbed.")

"*Latinorum*'s" main arguments in favor of Latin: 1. Latin helps you to understand the difference between what is important in life and what isn't. 2. If children are only to study what is "useful," why geometry for those who grow up to be doctors, or botany for engineers? 3. Latin stands to life's navigation as sailboat training to a navy officer. . . . A man is not seaworthy until he has learned to run a boat into the wind. . . . 4. You can always tell a man who has had a classical education from one who has not. For some—or many—reasons a man trained in the classic authors is less gullible in life. . . .

But "*Latinorum*'s" most charming, if least cogent argument is slipped in almost

unnoticed; by teaching Latin to moppets, parents are obliged, when Pierino needs help in his home work, to refresh their declensions and pore again over their "rosa, rosae, rosam. . . ." Nothing can better fill middle-aged eyes with tears of sweet nostalgia for long-spent youth. . . .

QUOTES FROM OUR READERS

LORRAINE STRASHEIM, Lincoln, Nebraska: You may be interested in the program which we are engaged in with the University of Nebraska. Our students in advanced math and the FL in the third year have an opportunity each spring to take examinations given by the corresponding University departments, for which they may earn three hours of free credit at the University. The program has done wonders for the third-year modern-language people who have always had a scanty enrollment. They have now advanced to the superior status of having separate classes of 10 and 12. . . .

ELEANOR MELOY, Libertyville, Illinois: Our school is shifting from a six to an eight-period day (from 53 to 40-minute periods). This will make it more difficult to cover the Latin work we have done before.

My students this past year have thoroughly enjoyed, and profited from work with Greek roots. For this, they of course learned the Greek alphabet.

SUSAN GREER, Streator, Illinois: Last spring I used the account of Gallic marriage, funeral customs, and the contrast with German religion, mores, etc. (Caesar) for quite an interesting panel on Roman mores.

JOHN G. HAWTHORNE, University of Chicago: The annual Latin Scholarship Competition sponsored by the Illinois Classical Conference was held in May. The University of Chicago was host to the competing students, chaperoning parents, and 30 teachers. Over 100 students took part in the examinations.

At this time, Miss Irene Crabbe of Evanston, who had initiated the Competition 17 years ago, and had managed it since

that time, announced her retirement from this arduous task. A presentation was given her by her fellow teachers at a testimonial luncheon, as a token of appreciation for her great contributions to the cause of Latin in Illinois.

EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL LATIN TEACHERS' INSTITUTE

St. Louis University held a two-day Latin Institute in June. The theme was "Latin's Perennial Place." Special features of the program were: "The Direct Object is Where You Find It," W. L. Carr; "Earliest Contacts Between the Roman Republic and Egypt," Eleanor Huzar; "Illuminated Vergilian MSS, St. Louis University's Vatican MSS Microfilm Library," Chaur. ey Finch; "Matching Method' in the Teaching of Classical Mythology," W. C. Korfmacher; "A Graduate Student's Tour in Classical Lands," E. J. Ament.

NORTH DAKOTA CLASSICS CLUB

Programs sponsored by the University of North Dakota Classics Club were included this past year on the All-University Calendar of Events mailed out to alumni and friends. Professor Demetrius Georgakas is the club's advisor.

GREEK PLAYS

The Departments of Classics and Music at Tufts University collaborated last spring in the production of a "Trojan Cycle" of scenes and choral songs from six plays of Euripides. Van Johnson of the Classics Department translated, arranged, and directed them for a dramatic reading held at Cohen Arts Center in Medford, Mass.

In May, Wellesley College students presented *Antigone* in the original Greek under the direction of Barbara McCarthy of the Classics Department. Masks worn by the entire cast were created in the Art Department. Technical advisors came from the Theatre Department, and new musical scores for two of the five odes sung, were provided by a junior student. Wellesley College students have been producing classics in Greek since 1934 when they presented "The Trojan Women."

A Tribute to Gilbert Murray

GEORGE A. PANICHAS

THE DEATH OF Sir Gilbert Murray at the age of 91 on May 20, 1957 marked the end of a scholar who, from the time that he learned the *Agamemnon* by heart as a schoolboy,¹ spent a lifetime studying and embracing Hellenism as a way of life. To Professor Murray, Hellenism was, in the words of Matthew Arnold, the renowned Hellenist of the nineteenth century, that "spontaneity of consciousness," that "sweetness and light," and "the best that is known and taught in the world";² yet Murray's own life of scholarship and teaching, and above all his adherence to Hellenism as the highest mode of living, was not in the least a flight into quietude and did not negate an active role in politics³ and the promotion of world peace, for this foremost classicist of modern times was a rare if not unique type of scholar. It is that uniqueness and rarity usually associated with the writer and teacher who unhesitatingly moves out of his intellectual niche in order to crusade openly and bravely for the very ideals and values that he espouses, but that are all too often relegated to the quiet confines of a lecture hall or the pages of a book.

In every respect, Gilbert Murray was a Hellenist, and his loyalty to the spirit of Hellenism, which he said was the "real moving power" of the western world, remained steadfast to the very end. In fact during a radio broadcast on his ninetieth birthday, he stated: "There has never been a day, I suppose, when I have failed to give thought to the work both for peace and for Hellenism. The one is a matter of life and death for all of us, the other of maintaining amid all the dust of modern industrial life our love and appreciation of eternal values."⁴ Indeed, as Professor of Greek at Glasgow University

1889-1899, as Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University from 1908 until his retirement in 1936, and as Charles Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry at Harvard in 1926, he resolutely stressed that the three major goals of Hellenism—that is, humanizing brutal masses, effecting universal concord, and proclaiming a unified cosmos—were the very same aspirations of the modern world.⁵

To Murray the past was a rich source of "high thoughts" and "great emotions," and even the elements of the past that had become, with the passage of time, obsolete and worthless, still retained the qualities of beauty and truth which remain eternal. It cannot be said, however, that Murray adopted Hellenism as a refuge from the modern world, a world that was "stamped by the institution of war, by the degradation of the poor, by drink, gambling, vice: above all, ever since the industrial revolution, by a strange lack of beauty, a lack of self-respect and human dignity."⁶ Neither can it be said that he ignored the present, for he clearly realized that man can easily become, in essence, a witless captive of the "material present," that "great Jailer and Imprisoner of man's mind." Murray was only too much aware of the vulgarity of a "dull and sad" modern world, and he felt that it was the scholar's great task to find necessary direction and meaning.

The scholar, Murray asserted, did not lose either his freedom or his effectiveness by reverting to the past. This he made very clear in his eloquent presidential address delivered to the Classical Association on January 8, 1918. Murray stressed that it was the scholar's duty to keep hold of the past and to treasure the best of the past, for only in this way would the "man of letters" really secure his freedom. The cacophony and the violence of an angry and sordid present, he pointed

This timely appreciation takes the place of *We See by the Papers* in this issue.

out, would be less frightening when the scholar would call back memories of calm and the spirit with which brave men long ago faced the same evils.⁷ Murray, as the late George Sarton so well pointed out, sought to interpret Greek wisdom, not only as a teacher and a poet, but as a friend, as one who did not take flight from the present, but rather emerged "from the beloved past to mingle with the living men of today and share their burdens."⁸ To the charge that his life was one of intellectual flight and retreat, Murray answered emphatically: "No: to search the past is not to go into prison. It is to escape out of prison, because it compels us to compare the ways of our own age with other ways."⁹

Spiritual rebirth, lasting values, intellectual inspiration, and laboring for the sake of the beautiful (*héneka tou kaloú*) were integral facets of the Hellenic spirit which, Murray realized, insisted that the world was something more than a meaner planet. In choosing Hellenism as the basis of world order and peace, as the prime example of *parre-sia*, *eleuthería*, *isonomía* (free speech, liberty, and equality before the law), he acted as a bridge span "from the ancient world . . . over into our distracted epoch."¹⁰ In Hellenism Murray saw the qualitative brilliance of an ancient way of life as opposed and superior to the quantitative mediocrity of the modern world. The megalomania of the modern day was happily lacking in Hellenism, a "humane civilization" that was not sullied by dogmatism and fanaticism. Free of extremism, Hellenism was a way of life in which there was genuine freedom of thought and speech, and in which there was always present a spirit of understanding and toleration. One of the finest qualities present in the Greek written record was that of its *intimacy*, for, as he points out, "You can only speak freely and intimately when you are not afraid, afraid of spies, of enemies, of friends who may turn and betray you."¹¹

It has been well said that Murray, through his outstanding translations of

the great Greek dramas, "brought Greek drama back to the modern stage."¹² Of course, critical opinions concerning the merits and defects of his translations have ranged from the glowing tribute by G. B. Shaw¹³ to the strong condemnation by T. S. Eliot. Shaw regarded Murray's translations, especially of Aeschylus and Euripides, as masterpieces, and Hesketh Pearson in his definitive biography writes that "Shaw ranked these translations as being in a class by themselves, and that the highest, in twentieth century drama."¹⁴ On the other hand, Eliot has very strongly criticized the translations; he has said that if the Classics are to survive in literature and as a part of the European mind, they need persons "capable of expounding them," and that "Professor Gilbert Murray is not the man for this." Eliot further criticizes Murray on the score that "the Greek actor spoke in his own language, and our actors were forced to speak in the language of Professor Gilbert Murray."¹⁵

It is not the purpose here to analyze Murray's abilities as a translator. The fact remains that the continuity of Greek thought has been made possible by the contributions of men like Gilbert Murray who, in the words of Christopher Dawson, recognized that "Apart from Hellenism, the European idea of man would be inconceivable."¹⁶ To Murray, Hellenism and Progress were synonymous, and time and again he pointed out that by reading the works of such ancient writers as Thucydides, Herodotus, Aeschylus, and Euripides, modern man might be able to find some of the answers that would help to alleviate and solve current problems. In Hellenism, thus, he saw spiritual values and efforts transcending the babble of the market-place, and he concisely expressed this when he wrote:

This is the true message of our Hellenic and European tradition. Serve humanity; glorify God; go forth, not so much to convert, but to contribute. Live in the service of something higher and more enduring, so that when the tragic transience of life at last breaks in

upon you you can feel that the thing for which you have lived does not die.¹⁷

Professor Murray strongly felt that modern society was addicted to material power and possession, to human selfishness and rapacity (*pleonexia*). He felt that in the twentieth century, much that was good—standards, values, absolutes—was dissolving.¹⁸ Concerned with the higher side of human life, he said that the daily business of the student and teacher was “to read, study, think, enjoy—not to fight or to bargain.”¹⁹ Thus, his preoccupation with Hellenism as a way of life led him to the conclusion that “the classical view is that there is such a thing as quality, that the highest quality is a thing of almost priceless value and worth taking trouble about.”²⁰ It is interesting to note here that while lecturing at Harvard in 1926, Murray was quite critical of the American intellectual and educational system, first because even the then President of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, had discontinued Greek as a required subject at the University, and secondly because the American educational scene itself noticeably lacked a clearcut affirmation of Hellenic principles—the result being a basic ignorance on the part of Americans of the art of living (*téchne*). Yet he underscored the fact that Hellenism, though neglected, was a vital necessity in the modern world and a cultural force of eternal value. In a lecture given to the Royal Academy of Arts in 1941, he voiced this feeling when he said: “And surely we may without self-flattery claim that in the high civilization which Europe has inherited and passed on to her kindred across the ocean is a Hellenism which the barbarian rejects but still longs to understand and assimilate.”²¹

In the thought and achievement of ancient Greece, Murray found that the artist had secured that measure of freedom and respect denied elsewhere, both in ancient and modern societies. In this respect, Hellenism was characterized by one of its finest and noblest qualities, for where modern society

still treats the artist as a “distinguished alien,” the artist in Greece was looked on as a “friend and fellow worker.” Murray found this all the more remarkable in view of the fact that Greece was surrounded by savagery and backwardness and the “swampy level of the neighbouring peoples.” That the artist was able to survive in Greece, amidst the “remnants of that primaevial slime from which Hellenism was trying to make mankind clean,” was to him an achievement of unequalled and inestimable importance. The Greek artist was able to secure his freedom in a small white-hot center of spiritual life, a way of life that was still beset by primitive institutions: by slavery, which was criticized in Greece some 2000 years before it was abolished in Europe, because in “Greece alone men’s consciences were troubled by slavery”; by the subjection of women, who in Greece found a greater degree of freedom from bondage, and were treated with respect and sympathy, and even as heroines in Greek tragedy (e.g. Clytemnestra, Antigone, Alcestis, Polyxena, Jocasta, Phaedra, Medea); and thirdly, by sexual unchastity, which the Greeks strived to diminish, so as to end the barbarities and human sacrifices connected with this perverted phase of life.²²

Murray had especial admiration for the Greek artist because the latter personified *so-phrosúne*, and his intellectual inquiry and artistic appreciation were always restrained by the combination of “a spirit of intense enjoyment with a tempering wisdom.” In combining the appreciation of good things and the power to refuse them—characteristic of the spirit of progress and of Greek civilization—Murray viewed the Greek artist as embodying the antithesis of Puritanism as against “the full artistic appreciation of life,” two spirits that fight a good deal with one another, but “are parts of one truth.” The Hellenic love of moderation, sobriety, temperance, and self-discipline symbolized to Murray the greatest accomplishment a civilization is capable of, for:

There is a way of thinking which destroys and a way which saves. The man or woman who is *sô-phro-n* walks among the beauties and perils of the world, feeling the love, joy, anger, and the rest; and through all he has that in his mind which saves.—Whom does it save? Not him only, but, as we should say, the whole situation. It saves the imminent evil from coming to be.²³

In speaking of the beauty, freedom, and flexibility of the Greek language itself, he aptly observed: "It would be almost impossible to discuss a modern political or philosophical problem in classical Hebrew, difficult even in Latin. But in Greek it can always be done. . . ." ²⁴ Murray believed Greek a finer language because it expresses the minds of finer and nobler men,²⁵ and Greek poetry, as well as Greek art, was distinguished for its beauty of structure, its rightness and simplicity, free of lavish ornamentation and exaggeration. Masterpieces of western literature, including *Paradise Lost* (the language of which, Murray found, "is elaborately twisted and embellished into loftiness and rarity," lacking the simplicity and straightforward direction of a Greek poem),²⁶ *Prometheus Unbound*, and even *Hamlet* and *Midsummer Night's Dream*, "are the children of Vergil and Homer, of Aeschylus and Plato."²⁷ He would not compromise, furthermore, in respect to being content with a knowledge of Latin and not Greek, since "the *exemplaria Graeca* are so extraordinarily good. They are our best pearls." In Greek literature, Murray found that quality of inspiration and beauty, where "the soul of man stands at the door and knocks; it is for each one of us to open or not to open, and if we do not open, the message that should have been immortal dies."²⁸

Professor Murray went so far as to assert that many problems of the modern world remained unsolved because twentieth-century man was ignorant of the Classics, and because some statesmen themselves had not "drunk at the eternal springs" of classical knowledge and inspiration.²⁹ There is no doubt, of course, as Horace Kallen well points

out, that ancient peoples outside of Greece could never become Greeks, and that to them Hellas would be only an ambition and an accomplishment, a discipline and a doctrine of their schools, a cherished source of imitation and adoption.³⁰ This also holds true today. Yet, one of the great disasters of modern times, Murray claimed, has been the failure of the western world to adopt actively and sincerely the virtues and qualities of Hellenism. Even the avoidance of World War III, the famous classicist said, is the supreme responsibility of a generation that "must use all its strengths, all its wisdom, to see that the main drift of the world is Hellenic and not barbarous."³¹

To Murray, ethics, morality, and good will—the essential attributes of Hellenism—embodied the inner meaning of our western civilization, and his university lectures, as a result, took the form of international pronouncements when Murray, who was president of the League of Nations Union from 1923 to 1938, and the first president of the United Nations Association General Council, sought with intense devotion to promote global peace.³² His Hellenism was too much a part of him to admit either the necessity or inevitability of war: he saw that in the world there is something of higher value than our own lives; he realized the futility of war, for "the weakest, if they care to use it, have the power to destroy." Indeed, even the scholar, who not only spends himself upon the advances and understanding of the things of the spirit, but who also seeks a solution of social questions and problems, finds that all his activities and aspirations are utterly annihilated by war. Murray's words, "Civilization created war, and has now reached a point where it must discard war," become all the more important today, although they were written in the twenties, after the first world war and before the second.

In Greek culture, even as in the Greek landscape, Murray found the quality of eternity, and to him Greek

scholarship was the fountainhead of the humanities in the western world. Striving to show the importance of high values in every-day living, he said that "if Shakespeare, Plato and Homer, if St. Paul and the New Testament, are not of value, then nothing is."³³ To the modern war-torn world that has in one way or another forgotten the significance of Hellenism, George Gilbert Aimé Murray managed somehow to show the hollow meaning of material power. He focused much needed attention on Hellenism in which he found real spiritual meaning, for to him the Greek Way was singularly characterized by its "pursuit of perfection" and its idealism. The Greeks were *philosophoi*, *philologoi*, *philokaloi*, and in "regions of imagination and aspiration" they were pioneers without whose accomplishments western civilization would be inconceivable. Murray's lifetime of devotion to Greek ideals is indeed a noble example of dedication to *humanitas*. A man like him, to be sure, lives on even after death, and his monument is not in marble or triple bronze, but in the texture of thought which he has woven into the very stuff of other men's lives. In his stirring tribute to Professor Murray, John Masefield, the Poet Laureate of England, echoes the sentiment of many when he writes:

Surely, in some great quietude afar,
Above Man's madness and the creed of
night,
Wisdom will crown this spirit with
her star
In conqueror's peace, in her undying
light.³⁴

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NOTES

¹ Murray was born on January 2, 1866 in Sydney, Australia, and went to England when he was 11. He attended the Merchant Taylors' School, a London public school, and as a youngster he read widely in the Classics. Later he attended St. John's College, Oxford where he attained high honors in Latin and Greek.

² See Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism," *Culture and Anarchy* (Cambridge, Eng., University Press, 1955) pp. 129-44.

³ He sought six times to be elected to the House of Commons from Oxford, but never succeeded.

⁴ Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 21, 1957, p. 35.

⁵ See *Hellenism and the Modern World* (Boston, 1954) pp. 52 ff.

⁶ "The Next Set of Problems But One," *Hibbert Journal* 25 (1927) 206.

⁷ "Religio Grammatici: The Religion of a 'Man of Letters,'" in *Tradition and Progress* (Boston and New York, 1922) p. 13.

⁸ Sartori, "Preface to Volume Thirty-Eight. A Tribute to Gilbert Murray and a Plea for Greek Studies," *Isis* 38 (1947) 5.

⁹ *Tradition and Progress*, p. 19.

¹⁰ Lucien Price, "Gilbert Murray at Ninety," *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1956, p. 79.

¹¹ *Greek Studies* (Oxford, 1946) p. 18.

¹² *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 15, pp. 978-79.

¹³ When Lucien Price compares Shaw and Murray in his article, he observes that in spirit Shaw is Hebraist, Murray Hellenist. He writes: "Protagonist and deuteragonist in classic drama of our time, they exchange places. When we are young and bellicose, Shaw is our man. . . . when we mature our man is Murray, urbane, patient, reasonable, and prepared in face of discouragement to keep at it for a life time." ("Gilbert Murray at Ninety," p. 77)

¹⁴ Pearson, G. B. S.: *A Full Length Portrait* (New York and London, 1942) p. 206. See also Stephen Spender's article, "The Riddle of Shaw" [1949] in *George Bernard Shaw: A Critical Survey*, ed. L. Kronenberger (New York, 1953) p. 237.

¹⁵ T. S. Eliot, "Euripides and Professor Murray," *Selected Essays* (New York, 1957 [1932]) pp. 47-48.

¹⁶ *The Making of Europe* (New York, 1932) p. 4.

¹⁷ "The Next Set of Problems But One," p. 206.

¹⁸ "The Classics," *The Fortnightly*, N. S. 152 (1942) 40.

¹⁹ "The Next Set of Problems But One," p. 193.

²⁰ "The Classics," p. 37.

²¹ *Greek Studies*, pp. 52-53.

²² The quotations and ideas in this paragraph are to be found in *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1924) pp. 3, 10, 15, 18, and 19-21.

²³ The quotations and ideas in this paragraph appear in *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 24-26.

²⁴ *Hellenism and the Modern World*, p. 34.

²⁵ "The Value of Greece to the Future of the World," *The Art World*, November, 1916, p. 130.

²⁶ "The Value of Greece," p. 129.

²⁷ *Tradition and Progress*, p. 27.

²⁸ "Are Our Pearls Real?" *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1955, pp. 46-47.

²⁹ *Greek Studies*, p. 194.

³⁰ Kallen, *Art and Freedom* (New York, 1942) p. 47.

³¹ *Hellenism and the Modern World*, p. 58.

³² The following ideas and quotations appear in "The Next Set of Problems But One," pp. 193, 195, and 206-207.

³³ "The Next Set of Problems But One," p. 206.

³⁴ Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 21, 1957, p. 35.

Contemporary Landmarks on an Old Frontier

AUSTIN M. LASHBROOK

IN THE SHIFTING SANDS of educational theories during the past three decades or more, we have found ourselves almost submerged in an imposing array of creeds, shibboleths, doctrines, all focused at one time or another on the place of languages in a twentieth-century curriculum. We have had our friends; we have had our enemies. To each of these we have turned a resolute, steadfast, and united front, because we know what we have believed. Our concern has been and is with those who do not know what we have believed. It is my purpose, then, to examine various and sundry educational theories and, on the basis of this examination, to propose the value and the utility of language studies in the curricula established by our critics. In so doing, I intend to use the terminology created by those same critics. For instance, we are told that the word "knowledge" must include not only factual materials, but also the skills necessary to develop a personality accepted by its own society as well-rounded and well-adjusted.¹

In an effort to create such personalities, the core course—or "common learnings program," as it is sometimes called (now established in many secondary school systems throughout the nation) occupies a major portion of the student's first, and often the second year, of high-school work. Such a course attempts to cut across the major essential fields of subject matter and within a definite framework to organize the unitary parts of each subject into a correlated, interrelated, cohesive whole.² The Educational Policies Commission has designated four major areas in which this may be accomplished.³ These areas are: 1. Education for Self-Realization; 2. Education for Human Relationships; 3. Education for Economic Efficiency; 4. Education for Civic Responsibility. What, then, do

foreign-language teachers have to offer to a common learnings program which advocates self-realization, better human relationships, economic efficiency, and civic responsibility, all agreed to be desirable aims focusing toward a common goal, a person active in adapting himself wholesomely to the needs of his own society?

It is not feasible that foreign languages be structurally interposed in the core course within the brief span of time allotted to them—a span of perhaps six weeks. Consequently, foreign languages must remain in the curriculum as a specialized subject along with geometry, physics, music, and other subjects which require longer periods of concentration. To attempt to teach the syntax and a reading ability adequate for pupil satisfaction within the common learnings course would be disastrous. The student would either emerge from such an exposure dimly aware of clichés so elementary that they hold no fascination, or with a hodge-podge of vocabulary words and grammatical functions that are isolated from each other and unattachable to the learner's experience.

We know, you and I, that the scope of languages is too great for this. Foreign languages must introduce to the pupil the limitless possibilities for pursuing the adventures of the entire human race. In the small space of time allotted by the core course to these languages, what valuable threads from its study can be woven into the warp and woof of such a program?

Whenever education for self-realization is emphasized, significant avenues of approach immediately open to the language teacher. Who were the noteworthy personalities of Rome? of Italy? of Greece? What personal traits of character made them leaders? What were the effects of their own society upon them? What type of society was

it? How does it compare with our own? What, in turn, were the effects of these people upon their own society? Do you feel that they achieved full self-realization? If not, in what ways did they fail?

The foreign-language teacher will naturally, in the organization of his material, categorize these personalities as statesmen, scientists, military leaders, writers, naturalists, and so on. In so doing, he may choose that group which fits the time and need simultaneously proceeding from the student's experience in the common learnings area.⁴

For instance, what personality achieves full, well-rounded growth without an appreciation for beauty? In our haste to teach students the technical aspects of co-operative living we too often overlook the needs of the human soul. Here, then, the opportunity is offered to present reproductions and illustrations of famous works of art, architecture, and sculpture from many countries, out of which may come discussions and written work. Here is the place for collaboration with the art and music departments.

Certainly common learnings will draw heavily upon social studies for lessons in human relationships. With their materials for study, foreign-language teachers can and do supplement and intersperse those social studies. During an allotted period cultural backgrounds may be studied.⁵ What contributions have the Romans, the French, the Spanish, and the Germans made to the history of mankind? How have these contributions directly affected us? What is the difference between the European and American reactions toward these cultural heritages? Why?

Languages may also be useful in developing economic efficiency on a generalized scale. In a country where a single day presents for use products imported from all parts of the world, skill in languages and an understanding of other peoples seem an economic necessity. What are the psycho-semantic elements of English and Romance tongues which have been influenced by

the Latin language?⁶ In what ways are these elements in operation today? How may these elements be influenced by climatic, geographical and economic factors?

While we are educating in economic efficiency, human relationships, and self-realization, we must not forget that we are also trying to develop civic responsibility. In our own society language teachers may point out to students our indebtedness to governments both past and present throughout the world. What political doctrines did we inherit from the Greek, Roman, French, and German political thought? How did these influence our own philosophy of government? One may establish these facts in a frame of reference by using a unit on the great national heroes of these countries. How did these men develop ideals consistent with democracy? How may we develop ideals consistent with democracy? What is democracy? What is meant by "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness"?

Some historical background of our own present-day language can be developed with emphasis on its basic elements, especially derivative relationships. Teachers of correct speech and writing have long advocated the necessity of an analytical understanding of our own language. In a common learnings course, we may relieve some of the problems of mental confusion created through inaccurate conceptions of words by such questions as: "Why do we spell as we do? Why is the same sound spelled in different ways in English?" The answers to such and other questions may reveal that language is the way in which people think, language is a continuous, creative process, it is a functional arrangement of words. It is a code of symbols, yes, but it is a code of symbols in which the basic processes of life are involved.⁷ And although these basic processes are essentially the same, the reaction toward them differs from society to society. Therefore, the thought patterns differ and these patterns represent the way in which people see, feel about, and use

basic processes of living. Grammatical analyses may be made to answer the question *why* as well as *when*. This explanation, while it reveals grammar as a study, also gets at the psychological and sociological foundations behind the language and lessens the eternal student question, "Why study this?"⁸

Another source for the common learnings course is the use of literature in translation. With the proper choice of materials it will be possible to make even the high-school freshman vividly aware of our indebtedness to foreign cultures. At a time of confusion, such as the present, the security of deep, historical roots can have a stabilizing effect. Young people cannot feel a moral responsibility toward a civilization of which they are ignorant. In literature in translation, if by no other means, they can be taught that Rome and later other countries of Western Europe were the sieve through which the ancient enlightenment of the Hebrew and the Greek was poured, and that masterpieces of this enlightenment were sifted through to leaven the technological, scientific, artistic, and religious achievements of the Western world.⁹ Professor Alfred North Whitehead has said, "In classics we endeavor by a thorough study of language to develop the mind in the regions of logic, philosophy, history, and of aesthetic apprehension of literary beauty."¹⁰ There is at least time in a common learnings course to give a student some penetrating glimpses of the avenues of approach through which Professor Whitehead's logic, philosophy, history, and aesthetic apprehension of literary beauty have traveled, and to make each pupil socially aware of his own responsibility as a traveler upon these avenues.

Whether we call these avenues transfer of training or some other name may be food for discussion. But to those who have insisted that transfer of training does not occur through the study of languages, let me quote from the *Forty-Ninth Yearbook for the National Society for the Study of Education*, a book which deals primarily with the

topics of teaching and learning: "Other things being equal, that education is best which has maximum transfer value. Transfer is at a maximum when old learning and the new problem situation are interrelated because of common or similar elements. Often these features exist, but they are not perceived by the learner. It becomes a major teaching task to bring about awareness into the interrelationships of old learning and new learning tasks."

As for the trends of language teaching, I know of no statistical evaluation of how these trends within the last quarter of a century have been influenced by the educational philosophies of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Morrison, or Hutchins. As for Dewey, however, learning is an experience which constitutes more than a mere activity project. Each new experience, each new activity must be a means to an end and that end, in turn, must serve another means, so that the process of learning becomes a continuous, enriching broadening channel of composite activities; it is a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Learning will continue through shared activity, it is true, but this sharing does not necessitate the physical presence of another individual in a group project. A shared experience may be a meeting of minds across centuries and miles. Certainly this experience is embodied in the study of languages.

The opponents of Mr. Hutchins have refuted his position regarding the significance of eternal and absolute truth. Mr. Hutchins feels that this eternal truth lends an order and meaning to education and that man may use reason to obtain an intuitive grasp of the first principles embodied in that truth. Once these principles are discovered and ordered, they provide the educator with the consistent body of knowledge which it is his duty to share with the students.

I have briefly mentioned the theories of Mr. Dewey and Mr. Hutchins, theories which are nationally significant in

modern education, in order to support the thesis that neither one is, in its final analysis, opposed to languages in the curriculum or to the classical studies. Nor should it be necessary to defend the teaching of languages or of classical studies by reference to either of these theories. Yet in the curriculum controversies, which have been raging to and fro throughout the nation, numerous defenses for various positions have been drawn from these two philosophies. Perhaps it would be more productive if the energies expended in defense of positions were utilized in pursuing knowledge for its own sake. In such a pursuit scholars would transcend the narrow limits of specialization. When theoretical experimentation ceases to be carried on, the educational system defeats its purposes.

As early as 1892, A. E. Housman seems to have foreseen the widening gap already apparent between the humanities and sciences.¹¹ Partisans of the sciences, said Mr. Housman, insist that the aim of learning is utility—the production, preparation, and distribution of commodities. Yet, he continued, success in the production, preparation, and distribution of commodities requires only a minimum knowledge of science, as men who have risen from poverty to riches have illustrated. In fact, those experiments in science which have the least contact with practical life often produce the most far-reaching results, such as electric lighting and the radio. Nor is a wide knowledge of science necessary to the individual. Once each man has learned the skill to be used in pursuit of his own vocation, he needs, for the purposes of gaining a livelihood, to learn nothing beyond that. Surely, then, the true aim of science is something other than utility.

Partisans of the humanities, on the other hand, define the end of education as the good and the beautiful. But, continued Mr. Housman, close examination does not support the fact that classical scholars have any higher standard of morality or any greater sense of

aesthetic discrimination than scholars in other fields of study. Nor can one say that the literary style of classical scholars writing in English manifests any greater perfection, grace, or fluency than many works not blessed by the hand of classical studies.

The true state of affairs, then, is that the acquisition of knowledge needs no justification. Intellectual curiosity is as native to man as the universal craving for food and drink. It is true that minds exist which do not show this desire. The reason is obvious. When the body is denied food and drink, it dies; when the intellectual hunger of man fails to be satisfied, that part of him dies also. Let a man, said Housman, as he concluded his thesis, acquire knowledge not for this or that external and incidental good which may chance to result from it, but for itself; not because it is useful and ornamental, but because it is knowledge, and therefore good for man to acquire.

This quest for knowledge on a broader and grander scale has grown more apparent in all fields of learning. It seems a reaction from the high degree of specialization practised in many institutions a generation or two ago. More recently the correlation between various branches of knowledge has been accomplished by survey courses. These have been introduced in one form or another at most of the major universities throughout the country. They have operated under such titles as "Humanities," "History of Civilization," "Biological Science," "Physical Science," and "Literature and Fine Arts."

In this trend toward generalization and more all-inclusive areas of study the leaders in language studies have not lagged behind. On the secondary level collaboration is taking place among foreign languages and social studies departments. One of the most successful experiments of this kind occurred at the University High School, Los Angeles, California, where the English and Latin teachers worked jointly to make units in English literature and vocabulary study coincide with back-

ground materials in the Latin classes.

At the University High School, University of Illinois, a course known as "Early World Cultures" was taught by the Latin department, with assistance from the art department, and was given high-school credit by the social studies department. The purpose of the course was to acquaint the student with the origins of the ideas which led to the production of artistic, literary, and scientific achievements in the Western World. It was designed so that the development of these ideas could be traced through literature from early times to their merging with philosophical thought of the Middle Ages prior to its reflowering in the Renaissance period. Emphasis was placed on material preparatory to college training in literature; that is, mythology, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Greek drama, and Roman and Greek history. Class discussion served to center interest on the patterns of society which produced the writings studied, their defects as well as their strong points, the analogies, contrasts, and parallels existing in contemporary society, and the influence of outstanding leaders on all these.

Co-operation with other departments is by no means confined to the Latin department. Educators, all of us, need to continue this process of broadening the specialized areas of knowledge. This needs to be done not only in the schools

but also among adults in community forums, civic clubs, and learned societies. We must not be afraid to contaminate the purity of our academic robes by working in the crowd with the mentally poor, the illiterate, and the mentally hungry, where often lies a potential untapped reservoir of support for our cause. Those who carry torches must pass them on. Otherwise, as Edna St. Vincent Millay has so aptly cautioned, "He whose soul is flat—the sky will cave in on him by and by."

University of Tennessee

NOTES

¹ Hilda Taba, "General Techniques of Curriculum Planning," *The Forty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (1945) p. 92.

² Othanel Smith, et al., *Fundamentals of Curriculum Development* (New York, 1950) p. 474.

³ Alexander J. Stoddard, et al., *Policies for Education in American Democracy* (Washington, D.C., 1946) p. 189.

⁴ G. Lester Anderson and Arthur I. Gates, "The General Nature of Learning," *The Forty-Ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (1950) pp. 24-26.

⁵ Walter V. Kaulfers, "Latin by Popular Demand," *CJ* 45 (1949) 89.

⁶ Walter V. Kaulfers, *Foreign Languages and Cultures in American Education* (New York, 1942) pp. 55-58.

⁷ Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education* (New York, 1929) p. 102.

⁸ Walter V. Kaulfers, *Modern Languages for Modern Schools* (New York, 1942) p. 312.

⁹ Whitehead, *The Aims*, pp. 111-15.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹¹ *Introductory Lecture* (Cambridge, Eng., 1937).

The Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting

Classical Association of the Middle West and South

The University of Texas, Austin

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The Center of Ancient Athens, shown in a remarkable photograph by ALISON FRANTZ, here used by permission of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

Left, the Temple of Hephaistos and Athene. Behind it, in distance, Mount Pentelicon.

Left center, the excavated area of the Agora, backed by the reconstructed Stoa of Attalos. Behind the Stoa, Mount Lycabettus.

Right, the bare Hill of Ares (Areopagus) in front of the Acropolis. Behind, Mount Hymettus.

NOTES

The Structure of Horace, *Odes* 1.15

ROBERT B. KIMBER

"THE PROPHECY OF NEREUS" is a poem about the making, keeping, and breaking of promises. Prophecy serves as the basic metaphor for the whole poem; and, as a poetic frame, it partially defines the promises made and broken within the story. For Horace selected this frame to suggest that all promises, being predictions of human action, are prophetic by nature. This device of prophetic context also suggests several other things about Horace's attitude towards his subject matter and the form he wants it to take in verse. The context suggests first that the Trojan war did not have to take place. At the given time, the war was a promise that should have been broken rather than kept. The idea of prophecy also suggests that the poet is not as interested in the events of the war as he is in the conditions of mind that led to the war. And in terms of form, prophecy leaves descriptions of ships, warriors, and battles to the epic while choosing an ode of nine stanzas for the more instructive business of tracing the human motives, promises, and betrayals underlying the conflict. Horace is not indifferent to the suffering involved in war, but his main interest in this poem is discovering why the promise of Nereus was kept while other promises, more beneficial to men, were broken.

The first two stanzas present the essential ideas and figures of the poem, and the remaining stanzas expand these terms while leading back to the original statement in a circular fashion, just as promises, broken or kept, meet themselves.

Pastor cum traheret per freta navibus
Idaeis Helenen perfidus hospitam,
ingrato celeris obruit otio
ventos, ut caneret fera

Nereus fata: mala ducis avi domum,
quam multo repetet Graecia milite,
coniurata tuas rumpere nuptias
et regnum Priami vetus.

The effect of these stanzas depends a great deal on Horace's skilful placing of words. *Perfidus* applies to Paris who has misused the hospitality of Menelaus and seduced Helen into breaking her marriage. Also, by its placement, the adjective clearly defines Helen who rather overplayed her role as an entertainer. Through this same method (*Nereus fata*), Horace implies that Nereus is a maker of the cruel or wild fates as well as their singer. A prophecy or a promise is an assertion about future human action. If a man promises to love and cherish, his future is determined to the extent that he will have a pleasant, female companion until he dies, provided he keeps his promise. If he fails to keep it, the female may become unpleasant and possibly uncompanionable to the point of divorce. But either way, the future has been partially determined because something will have to be done about that promise in the future. Nereus' promise is different, for the keeping of it will bring on the cruel fates rather than the pleasant ones. But both the husband and Nereus have given a theoretic form to the future, just as God in *Genesis* partially defined the fate of Man when He promised death to Adam and Eve if they ate of the tree of knowledge. Without that promise, future events could never have occurred as they did.

Lines 7-8 pick up these ideas, complicating them still further yet clarifying the problem of the poem. The construction of these lines is zeugmatic as Bennett's notes point out, but its in-

terest goes further than rhetoric. Greece has made a vow to break the nuptials of Helen and Paris, a vow made to break promises that came about through the breaking of earlier promises. In addition, the zeugma allows the force of *rumpere* to take *regnum* as a second object, thus implying that the ancient reign of Priam, that is, the ruler's responsibility for the safety of his people, is another promise that will be broken. These lines expand Paris' role as a faith-breaking shepherd, too. Aside from his upbringing, Paris is a member of the Trojan royal family and, therefore, a pastor of the city to some degree. His actions are bringing ruin on his flock rather than preserving it. Although this extension may seem unwarranted here, the imagery of the eighth stanza, which will be discussed later, offers further evidence for this point.

Finally, the management of tenses and clauses in these stanzas, and in the whole poem, accurately reflects the notion of prophecy. The entire poem modifies one independent clause, that moment when Nereus *ingrato celeris obruit otio / ventos*. Since this clause is the only one in the poem that can stand alone, it suggests that an uncomfortable present is the only thing one can be sure of if one has a criminal past. The calm may well be unpleasant to the winds that like to scurry about, as Bennett suggests, but it is also unpleasant to Helen and Paris who are criminals and have to worry about pursuers in fast rowboats. The past holds the crime that is always pursuing, and the future holds nothing but being pursued. Thus, the future is bound to be a miserable present, and the wedding vows are going to promise destruction and betrayal instead of peace and fidelity.

Working from the prophecy made in the first two stanzas, Horace goes ahead to clarify and add to the suggested ironies.

heu heu, quantus equis, quantus adest viris
sudor! quanta moves funera Dardanae
genti! iam galeam Pallas et aegida

currusque et rabiem parat.

nequiquam Veneris praesidio ferox
pectes caesariem grataque feminis
imbelli cithara carmina divides,
nequiquam thalamo gravis

hastas et calami spicula Cnosii
vitabis strepitumque et celerem sequi
Aiace; tamen heu serus adulteros
crines pulvere collines.¹

In the first of these stanzas, the run-on lines, the repetition of *quantus*, and the string of nouns, *galeam, aegida*, etc., give an audible effect of force and speed that corresponds to a violent Fate rushing down on Helen and Paris. Also, there is a deliberate progression from horses to men, to the people of Troy, and finally to Athena. This suggests that all life, animal, human, and divine, is affected by war, and still further implications are added to this stanza by the next line, *nequiquam Veneris praesidio ferox*. Placing Athena and Venus together in this way makes the war a matter of divine strife, and since Paris has been made *ferox* by the protection of Venus, there is also a suggestion that gods and men become partially animal in war. Also, at the base of the entire situation, Venus appealed to Paris' animal nature by promising him the most beautiful woman in the world, and, under the influence of this sensual love, Paris is made bold, but bold in the sense of wild, therefore unreasonable and inhuman. And Venus did all this for the sake of a rather silly beauty contest. The sensible promises that keep human life running in a peaceful way have been broken for the sake of promises based on irrational desires.

Horace adds to the ironies of this passage by setting up several parallels. Paris, like Nereus, is a singer, but despite the fact that he sings love songs pleasing to women, he too is a singer and agent of the *fera fata*. His *grata carmina* are means of whiling away the *ingratum otium* and means of bringing on ruin. Raging Athena prepares her war helmet, and Paris, mad with love, combs his hair. The helpful swift-

ness of the winds now becomes an enemy in the form of *celer Aiax*. The sanctuary of home and the bridal chamber is useless, and, finally, Paris' hair, a helmet suitable for love's battles, becomes defiled in the actual battles that his love has caused.

Besides the ironies of thought and image here, further ironies are established through sound patterns. The repeated *nequiquam* echoes the *quantus*, *equis*, and *currusque* in the preceding stanza. The alliteration transfers the stupidity of Paris' attempted flight to the suffering involved in war. Thus, the war and Paris' effort to escape are both condemned as pointless in their execution and, ultimately, in their cause. Also, the *caesaries*, *cithara*, and *carmina*, Paris' effeminate weapons, are ironically compared by alliteration to the *calami spicula Cnosii*.

Up to this point, Horace has shown how promises made in madness undermine themselves while giving an unwarranted sense of security, even divinity. The next three stanzas make the motives and effects of these promises more explicit, completing the ironic reversals already suggested.

non Laërtiaden, exitium tuae
gentis, non Pylum Nestora respicis?
urgent impavidi te Salaminii
Teucer, te Sthenelus sciens

pugnae, sive opus est imperitare equis,
non auriga piger. Merionen quoque
nosces. ecce fuit te reperire atrox
Tydides melior patre,

quem tu, cervus uti vallis in altera
visum parte lupum graminis immemor,
sublimi fugies mollis anhelitu,
non hoc pollicitus tuae.

The idea of pursuit is brought up from the first stanza with the verb *respicis*. In this context the word means "respect" or "pay heed," but it also applies in its basic meaning of "look back" because Paris is a hunted man who would do well to look back at the hunters. The horses and Athena's chariot, both mentioned before, have changed from articles of war to things used for the specific task of chasing

Paris. Having been emasculated by Venus, paradoxical as that may seem, Paris has been taken down still another step. The conflict has been reduced to what it is, the pursuit of one animal by another. Paris' role as a shepherd has come to an inglorious end. Instead of defending his wife and city against the wolf, the traditional enemy of the flock, Paris must now run himself, a frightened, helpless animal, and whatever pleasures he has derived from his venture must be forgotten. Paris' role as a shepherd seems to emerge clearly in the explicit pastoral imagery of this stanza, and his failure in this role, suggested in the first two stanzas, also becomes clear. Venus has deprived Paris of the weapons that a warrior or shepherd needs for actual battles against the wolf while she has left him the speed and grace of the stag, weapons fit only for love's battles. Hence, the pastor is unable to save the citizens of Troy; but, ironically, he is the only person who is swift enough to have the slightest chance of escape. Finally, though, even the stag's speed is insufficient, and the wolf slaughters him along with the sheep. The picture of the stag running *sublimi anhelitu* carries out this ironic conception. The words apply very nicely as description, but they provide a pointed view of the retreat which is anything but sublime. The tag to these three stanzas, *non hoc pollicitus tuae*, brings back with cruel abruptness all the promises Paris had made, contrasting their grandeur with his abject flight.

Having returned to the original figure of flight in this way, Horace concludes with a stanza that calls back the language of the first two stanzas.

iracunda diem proferet Ilio
matronisque Phrygum classis Achillei;
post certas hiemes uret Achaicus
ignis Iliacas domos.

Horace chooses the word *hiemes* to suggest that the wait for Achilles' fleet will be not only cold and unpleasant, an *ingratum otium*, but also a period of mental storms and anxiety since the

coming of the fleet is inevitable. The Grecian fire will raze Troy for Helen as well as for the other wives of Troy, and it will end both the respite and the dread found in the allotted winters' snows (*heimes uret*). The association of *ingratum otium* with *hiemes* may appear self-contradictory because the calm of stanza one is clearly one of hot, motionless air at sea. However, this mixing of remote metaphors seems legitimate in that Helen and Paris are always living in the eye of a hurricane. In modern gangster terminology, the heat is on, regardless of the season.

By closing with the word *domos*, Horace recalls the *mala ducis avi domum* of the second stanza and implies that the defenders of Menelaus' nuptials will not only destroy the city but also Paris' nuptials and Priam's vows to his people. The use of *domos* thus summarizes both the cause and the effect of the war. The promises of marriage and of respect for the home that Paris destroyed for one man, the Greeks will destroy for thousands.

Finally, then, if this analysis is cor-

rect, the poem emerges as a poetico-geometric progression. The constant factor of a broken promise permits an infinite number of multiplications that draw more and more people into the conflict, and, in this case, the ironies increase in proportion to the multiplications. Dramatically, the poem is a progression from human status to animal status for everyone involved. But really, the end is the beginning. The thematic basis of the poem seems to be the promise a man must keep to remain human, the promise to live reasonably by the laws reason has devised. In breaking this promise, Paris automatically subjected himself to pursuit by wolves. Given this situation, Nereus could make no other prophecy than the one he did make, and its irony lies in the fact that it is a promise that had to be made and kept because a fundamental human promise was broken.

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NOTE

- ¹ I read *crines* here rather than *cultus*.

Notes on the Background and Character of Libo Drusus

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THE LONGEST ACCOUNT of the conspiracy of M. Libo Drusus which has been preserved is that of Tacitus (*Ann.* 2. 27 f.). The historian, as he himself states, recounts the events in detail in order to show the first occurrence of the evils of delation.¹ From shorter references in other authors² and from an inscription which mentions the conspiracy,³ modern historians have concluded that Drusus was definitely involved in an attempt to overthrow Tiberius.⁴ Seneca (*Ep.* 70. 10) cites the death of Libo Drusus as an example of commendable suicide and describes him as "a young man as stupid as he

was noble and aspiring to far more than anyone could hope for at that time or he at any time." From a consideration of the characteristics given in this description and from a few details about his family background, we may have some indication of what circumstances influenced Libo Drusus' conduct.

Seneca's use of the term *stolidus* must be taken to mean that Libo Drusus was foolish enough to hope to overthrow Tiberius and not that he was a person of low mentality.⁵ Otherwise, he would hardly have retained the office of pontifex (Suet. *Tib.* 25) nor

would Tiberius have appointed him praetor (Tac. *Ann.* 2. 28), since even under the principate legal and financial decisions were required of the holders of this office.

The Scribonii were an outstanding noble family, dating from the Hannibalic war.⁶ Lucius Scribonius Libo, both the paternal grandfather and one of the maternal great-grandparents of Libo Drusus,⁷ was a soldier and diplomat, who married his daughter to Sextus Pompey⁸ and later, when the political tide had changed, gave his widowed sister, Scribonia, in marriage to the rising Octavian (Dio 48. 16. 3; Suet. *Aug.* 62. 2). He seems to have retired from public life after his consulship in 34 B.C. (Dio 49. 38. 2).⁹

Libo Drusus, therefore, had inherited all the glory of the Pompeii and their connections, the Lucillii, Mucii Scaevolae,¹⁰ and relationship with the family of Augustus through the Atii (Suet. *Aug.* 4. 1),¹¹ as well as being a cousin of Gaius and Lucius Caesar through his great-aunt Scribonia, their grandmother. He was as noble as the scion of any senatorial family and as a result dared to aspire to the supreme power fifty years before Seneca wrote in a period when the Julio-Claudians were undisputed rulers.

His ambition was furthered by his faith in his exalted destiny. The Scribonian and Pompeian families had salvaged enough of their vast holdings¹² for the young Libo Drusus¹³ to have been brought up in affluence. He had ample leisure and evidently devoted some of it to dabbling in the occult. This last interest may have resulted from family attitudes and experience. Astrologers basing their predictions on the course of the stars were accepted by the Roman nobility and even the emperors,¹⁴ very much as a psychoanalyst is a necessity in some circles today, but other forms of inquiry into the future were forbidden by successive legal regulations.¹⁵ The Pompeii especially seem to have had some leanings toward witchcraft. Lucan's account of Sextus' séance with Erichtho, the

Thessalian witch and necromancer, before the battle of Pharsalus,¹⁶ while it doubtless owes much to Lucan's poetic imagination and the Stoic attitude toward magic, still points to a tradition that the Pompeii were not above resorting to witchcraft. Furthermore, Pompeia, Sextus' daughter and Libo's mother, had spent some of her early and impressionable years in the Near East (Dio 49. 11. 1). From the fact that her mother, Scribonia, is not mentioned at this time, it is assumed that she was no longer alive.¹⁷ The little girl may, therefore, have come under the influence of eastern attendants, who returned to Italy in the household of Sextus Pompey and continued to spread an interest in numerology, astrology, and even necromancy among both their associates and masters.

The two charges against Libo Drusus, as given specifically by Tacitus (*Ann.* 2. 30), would not prove that he was plotting revolution. He was charged with having consulted a practitioner of magic arts as to whether he would be rich enough to pave the Via Appia with money all the way to Brundisium, and with having made certain mystic notations in a list of the names of prominent persons. Faving with money (i.e. gold coins) is definitely oriental imagery. Coins enough to cover the entire extent of the Via Appia is an expression descriptive of vast wealth, like the phrase "mountains of gold" in Terence (*Phorm.* 68). It need not, however, imply that he aspired to attain the imperial power, as was intimated by his accusers. As for the baneful signs in his handwriting, which were the final reason for accusing Libo Drusus before the senate, it is conceivable that this was writing in an oriental alphabet known to him and used for private notes on prominent persons, which had fallen into the hands of his betrayers.

The idea of a genuine plot stems from other indications. Throughout the principate of Augustus, there had been conspiracies to overthrow his rule both by members of the senatorial order and by men of lower rank (Suet.

Aug. 19). So it is not surprising that the members and supporters of the house of the Pompeii-Scribonii, which was not only *pina imaginibus* (Tac. Ann. 2. 27. 2) but even related to Augustus (Tac. loc. cit.; Suet. Aug. 4. 1.)—some of whose ancestors had been somewhat less than aristocratic, according to Mark Antony (Suet. Aug. 4. 2)—attempted to come into what they considered their rightful position of leadership in place of Tiberius. The Julii claimed descent from Venus, to be sure, but had not Libo's grandfather Sextus boasted himself a son of Neptune (Dio 48. 19. 2), even adding a sea-blue robe to symbolize his rule over the deep (Dio 48. 48. 5)? Though probably garbled, the incidents recounted by Suetonius (Tib. 25. 3) indicate that Tiberius was aware of the machinations of Libo Drusus. He refused a meeting alone with him and while conferring with him in the presence of his son Drusus, held to Libo's right arm in pretense of leaning on it as they walked. The story that he had a lead knife substituted for the usual sacrificial knife when Libo was sacrificing with the pontiffs, if true, might show that Tiberius with a wry sense of humor was hinting that he knew of some plot of Libo's to assassinate him, for a lead blade in place of a steel one would be as obvious to anyone who took up the knife as a modern rubber stage dagger.

It is, accordingly, understandable that with a consciousness of noble ancestry unsurpassed even by those who were the supreme rulers of Rome and as a result of family tradition and environment, with a faith in eastern charlatans, who assured him of the truth of prophecies which he wished to hear, Libo Drusus became involved in a conspiracy against Tiberius in company with his numerous aristocratic kinsmen, who promptly deserted him when he fell under suspicion (Tac. Ann. 2. 29. 1). Furthermore, after his suicide, they minimized in the family archives the extent and seriousness of the attempt to overthrow and seize the gov-

ernment.¹⁸ These family records were the documents which Tacitus used to present the situation for future generations and to blacken the reputation of Tiberius.

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NOTES

¹ Furneaux, in his edition of the *Annals* (2nd ed., Oxford, reprinted 1934) explains in the note on the passage that though Tacitus had shown (1. 72, 74) that delators had given evidence earlier, this is the first example of a man's personal friends reporting his acts to Caesar.

² Suet. Tib. 25; Vell. Pat. 2. 130; Sen. Ep. 70. 10.

³ CIL 9. 4192 (Fasti Amiterni, a.d. 16).

⁴ F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931) pp. 58, 59; "Tacitus and Aristocratic Tradition," CP 21 (1926) 289 f.; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius* (Baltimore, 1943) pp. 27, 115; *Criminal Trials and Criminal Legislation under Tiberius* (Middletown, Conn., 1935) pp. 12-20; "Tacitean Patterns in Treason Trials," TAPhA 83 (1932) 279-311, especially 283-85; M. P. Charlesworth, in CAH, vol. 10, p. 629; F. H. Cramer, *Astrology in Roman Law and Politics* (Philadelphia, 1954) pp. 101, 254 f.

⁵ All the MSS of Seneca read *solidus*, emended to *stolidus* by Hermann Torrentius (van Beek), a classicist of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Seneca evidently wrote *stolidus* in contrast with *nobilis*, which follows. Modern historians regard him as foolish, i.e. vain, rather than dull; e.g. Marsh, *Reign of Tiberius*, p. 58, "stupid young man"; CP 21, p. 294, "foolish, but harmless, young man"; Charlesworth, CAH, vol. 10, p. 629, "empty-headed fool."

⁶ Prominent members or connections of the family were: L. Scribonius, sent back to the senate by Hannibal after Cannae (Livy 23. 61. 6); L. Scribonius Libo, *triumvir mensarius* in 216 B.C. (Livy 23. 21. 6); the official appointed to set up the Puteal Libonis (Festus 333M); the river of the Ludi Libonis, mentioned by Pliny (NH 36. 102) as of the Augustan period; a historian named Libo, mentioned by Cicero (Att. 13. 30. 2; 13. 33. 3; 13. 44. 3) and a grammarian Libo, referred to by Macrobius (3. 18. 13). These last two may possibly be the same person.

⁷ Libo's father is identified as the consul of 16 B.C. and a son of L. Scribonius Libo, the brother of Scribonia Caesaris, in *Pros. Imp. Rom.*, part 3, Scribonius, No. 211. Mommsen (Eph. Ep. 1 [1872] 146) thinks he was the son of another sister, Scribonia, otherwise unknown, who took his mother's name. Drumann-Groebe (*Gesch. Roms*, 2nd ed., vol. 4, Table, pp. 620-21) regard Libo, the husband of Pompeia, as not identifiable and conclude that in the case of M. Livius Drusus Libo, consul in 15 B.C. (Dio 54. 2. 1) also, his exact relationship to the various families cannot be determined.

⁸ R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939) p. 45, n. 3; p. 228, n. 2.

⁹ He had negotiated the conference between Sextus and Octavian at Puteoli (Appian, B. Civ. 5. 60. 71) and urged Sextus to yield to Anthony (ibid. 5. 139). He is mentioned in Cic. Fam. 1. 1. 3; 3. 4. 2; Att. 7. 1. 2; 8. 11b. 2; 9. 11. 4; 10. 4. 2; Caes. B. Civ. 1. 26. 3; 3. 5. 3; 3. 15. 6; 3. 18. 3; Plut.

Ant. 7; App. B. Civ. 5. 52, 73, 139; Dio 41. 47, 48, 49, *passim*. See also Syme, *Roman Revolution*, p. 269.

¹⁰ The paternal grandfather of Pompey the Great was a sister of Lucilius the satirist (Porph. on Hor. Sat. 2. 1. 29). Velleius (2. 29. 2) says that Pompey's mother was a Lucilla of the senatorial branch of the family. The matter is discussed by Allen B. West, "Lucilian Genealogy," *AJP* 40 (1928) 240-52. Sextus Pompey's mother Mucia, of the Mucii Scaevolae divorced by Pompey, later married an Aemilius Scaurus. She had influence with Sextus (App. B. Civ. 5. 72). By pleading with Octavian she saved the life of M. Aemilius Scaurus, son of her second marriage, after Actium (Dio 51. 2. 5). For her career, see M. Hadas, *Sextus Pompey* (New York, 1930) pp. 3, 5, 11, 93.

¹¹ This is overlooked by Syme, who gives only the connections with Octavian through Scribonia's descendants. Though no longer related legally, Octavian and Scribonia still had *consanguinei* from both families through Julia.

¹² He had estates in Picenum (Plut. *Pomp.* 6. 1; Vell. Pat. 2. 29. 1); see Hadas, *Sextus Pompey*, p. 61.

¹³ Both Tacitus and Suetonius refer to him as *adulescens*, a term which could have been applied

to a man up to his fortieth year. His mother, Pompeia, was probably born about 40 B.C., for in 39 (App. B. Civ. 5. 73) she was betrothed to Marcellus, then aged three. The latter, however, after a shift in political alliances and power, actually became the husband of Octavian's daughter Julia. We have no evidence as to when Pompeia married L. Scribonius Libo, identified as the consul of 16 B.C., but since M. Libo Drusus had an older brother, Lucius, consul in A.D. 16, he was born presumably about the year 20 B.C. and was still properly described as *adulescens* at the time of his suicide in A.D. 16.

¹⁴ A Scribonius, an astrologer (*mathematicus*) who had foretold the future of Tiberius, may have been a freedman or connection of the Scribonii Libones (Suet. Tib. 14. 2).

¹⁵ The Chaldeans were banished repeatedly from 139 B.C. on (Val. Max. 1. 3. 3), in the first century B.C. (Dio 49. 43. 5; 52. 36. 2, 3), and again after Libo's death under Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 2. 32; 6. 29; Suet. Tib. 36; Dio 56. 25. 5; 57. 15. 8); cf. Cramer, *Astrology*, pp. 233-40.

¹⁶ Lucan 6. 413-603; cf. H. J. Rose, "The Witch Scene in Lucan," *TAPA* 44 (1913) 1-11.

¹⁷ Hadas, *Sextus Pompey*, p. 148, n. 4, quotes Drumann-Groebe, vol. 4, p. 591.

¹⁸ Marsh, *CP* 21, p. 300.

THE VERGILIAN SOCIETY CLASSICAL SUMMER SCHOOL IN ITALY *July and August, 1958*

The Vergilian Society will conduct its annual summer program in the Naples area in four separate sessions, of about two weeks each: June 30-July 12; July 14-27; July 28-Aug. 9; Aug. 21-31. Guidance and lectures by American and Italian scholars at Cumae, Lake Avernus, Pompeii, Herculaneum, Misenum, Baiae, Pozzuoli, Capri, Ischia, Paestum, Stabiae, Vergil's Tomb, and the great Naples Museum.

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Notes on the Simile in Homer and His Successors:

I. Homer, Apollonius Rhodius, and Vergil

WARREN D. ANDERSON

NO FIGURE OF SPEECH is more familiar than the simile. Possibly it deserves special attention for that very reason, since familiarity dispenses with strict accounting of fundamentals. This paper seeks, accordingly, to examine the significance of the simile in Homer, Apollonius Rhodius, and Vergil.

Simile is specifically designated in classical literature by two and only two words, Latin *similitudo* and Greek *eikón*. Unfortunately, *similitudo* (despite Harpers') does not mean "simile" as the thing adduced for comparison. Like all such nouns ending in *-tudo*, it expresses an abstract concept and refers rather to the process of adducing, to simile as a device. Cicero shows this in defining *similitudo* as *oratio traducens ad rem quampiam aliquid ex re dispari simile*, "a use of language to transfer to any thing some similar quality from a different thing."¹

Unlike *similitudo*, the word *eikón* in Greek does mean "simile" as such, the thing compared and not the process of comparison. Exactly as in the case of its English transliteration "icon," the original and predominating sense of the word is "image," the literary usage being secondary. This original meaning may be expressed, however, not only by "image" but by "likeness"; the same root produced the common verb *éōika*, "to be like" (also "to seem," in Attic).

The idea of an image or a likeness implies that the Greeks, when they used simile, possibly meant to convey something more than mere similarity in our sense. The situation seems rather to be one of identity, dimly conceived but strongly felt. A notion of identity underlies Latin *similis* also: its root

**sem-* appears in Latin *simul* and Greek *háma*, both expressing temporal identity, and also in Greek *homós*, meaning "one and the same" or "jointly possessed," with its genitive *homoiú* becoming an adverb, "together" in space or time. Finally, *similis* is paralleled morphologically by Greek *homalós*, meaning "even" or "level" and also "of equal degree." These facts of language² do not prove the conjecture advanced here. They do suggest that it may be profitable to examine the uses of simile.

At this point the objection could well be raised that in the case of Homer much solid work has already been done. No one could deny it. Even if the field be limited to books written in English, a number of examples readily come to mind: Jebb's *Homer*, which retains striking value after more than a half-century; Bassett's *Sather Lectures, The Poetry of Homer*, still considered by many to be the foremost American contribution to this field of scholarship;³ and Bowra's *Tradition and Design in the Iliad*, with its characteristic union of flawless style and compelling argument. From Bowra in particular we have learned the various purposes for which a Homeric simile may be used—to mark, for example, an important pause or crisis in the action, or again to illuminate the different aspects of individual natures or the successive stages of a complex situation, always providing perspective and a kind of relief by altering the focus of attention.

A recent book by the German scholar Roland Hampe has provided a needed supplement to Bowra's remarks.⁴ Hampe here argues that the Homeric simile represents the most concise available means of stating a conception in the most highly poetic manner pos-

This paper, appearing as the first of two articles, was presented at the 1957 CAMWS meeting.

sible. He also establishes the important related point that the simile does not serve as a mere addition to the main narrative, but actually replaces it, conveying what could not in point of fact be expressed through regular narration. The comparison, he says further, may not infrequently be made in depth, with several points of contact; there is no reason, accordingly, to seize on a single aspect of such similes and dismiss all the rest as irrelevant, though beautiful.⁵

Hampe's claim that the similes replace Homer's narrative in a vitally meaningful way needs a counter-balance. This is provided earlier in his book, when he states that they are not employed for their own sake, but have in every case a dependent relationship to the characters and events of the poem.⁶ Most readers of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* will accept his remark as true, if rather obvious; yet one finds even so admirable a scholar as Professor Notopoulos⁷ speaking of the "ornamentation" of Homer's similes. The choice of terms scarcely seems a happy one, for we are not dealing here with random embellishment. As Mackail pointed out almost fifty years ago, "In poetry of a low heat this [the simile] tends to become merely ornamental . . . but in poetry of a high temperature"—and Mackail is speaking of Homer—"any enrichment which is mere decoration is out of place; it only interrupts and retards, unless together with its quality as ornament it illuminates its context."⁸ Perhaps we need less concern with phonograph records of Yugoslav bards and more awareness that Homeric epic is sophisticated court poetry.

The complex of ideas now set up permits us to re-examine the suggestion made earlier that simile actually deals with a kind of identity. It was seen that the Greek and Latin words most closely related to this concept show a powerful tendency toward expressing sameness rather than likeness in their root meanings. Such a line of argument may seem to be countered

by the fact of our traditional definitions of simile and metaphor. We commonly distinguish one from the other by saying that the former maintains A is like B, while the latter states or implies that A is B. In doing so we often assume the two categories to be distinct, and indeed mutually exclusive.

The present paper argues that such an assumption does violence to the facts. It may be worth mentioning that Aristotle, while he gives the same working definitions as those just mentioned, also has this to say: "The simile is also a metaphor; the difference is but slight. . . . They are really the same thing."⁹ The philosophical question of identity raises appalling difficulties, and no attempt will be made here to define the essential nature of the simile within a philosophical frame of reference. Even Plato's brilliant Theory of Forms, we recall, comes crashing down when the question is raised of just how these archetypes can participate in reality. Yet, without being sure how to define identity, one may find grounds for denying the common assumption that metaphor involves identity while simile does not.

It is already known and admitted that Homeric simile on the most primitive level does reflect a strong element of identity. When the nymph Thetis comes out of the sea "like a mist" (*εἰὼτ omiche*) the comparison reveals her almost certain origin in the sea-mist that steals up onto the land.¹⁰ The half-dozen similes of *Beowulf* have this primitiveness; it is the hallmark of saga, and Homeric scholarship has begun to realize that the elaborated similes of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* constitute a different, and later, development.

Much has been written concerning the nature of extended simile as we find it first in Homer.¹¹ Bassett, for example, shows its affinities with the substance and mood of lyric poetry.¹² Some of the practical purposes it serves have been mentioned here, and one cannot readily imagine any important addition being made to Bowra's remarks. The actual significance of the simile, how-

ever, has received surprisingly little attention until very recently. Hasty references to such qualities as "relief," "illumination," and "insight" were the sum of what an English-speaking reader could find, and these plainly were not enough.

The situation is different now, thanks to the work of a group of German scholars whose best thinking is represented in Wolfgang Schadewaldt's exciting collection of essays called *Von Homers Welt und Werk*.¹³ The difference may be said to be a change of opinion. No longer is the simile regarded as essentially an ornament; indeed, it has been discovered to have an integral and profoundly important part in Homer's method of presenting reality.¹⁴ Seen in this new light, Homer's similes convey aspects of experience not at second hand but with immediacy.

To say this much is to give only a hint of what might be said. Nevertheless, we must now proceed by indirection, attempting to reveal something of Homer's technique as we consider two of those who followed him in the epic tradition, Apollonius Rhodius and Vergil.

Half a millennium lies between Homer and Apollonius. During those centuries, a wealth of powerful new literary forms had displaced epic in mainland Greece. Only on the coasts and islands of southwestern Asia Minor did it retain the ability to survive; and to this region, to the island of Rhodes, Apollonius came in his disgust with the miniature-makers of Alexandria.

Callimachus, the T. S. Eliot of the Alexandrian literary scene, had said *méga biblion méga kakón*, "A lengthy book is a lengthy bore." Apollonius thought otherwise; and out of his conviction was born, in a long travail, the *Argonautica*. He proposed to relate a story well-known even to Homer, the quest of those who sailed on the Argo to find the Golden Fleece, but the heart and meaning of his work is the fatal encounter between Jason and Medea. He wrote the first romantic epic.

Two examples¹⁵ will show what the simile has now become. Medea is eager to go to her sister's room and reveal what is in her passionate and uneasy heart, yet she cannot at first overcome her scruples:

This way and that her fear bore her in
vain;
When she ran out, shame tethered her
again
Fast in her room, by passion of her will
Still driven, by her shame impeded still.
Three times she tried, three times herself
she stayed,
But fell upon her pillow the fourth time
Face downward, like a bride within her
room
Mourning the lusty groom
Brothers and parents had given her in
troth,
And still her women, for shame and
thought of him,
She dare not join, but sits and cries in a
corner;
For him some doom laid low, before they
both
Came in each other's blisses to exult.
With burning heart she sits, a silent
mourner
Watching the bed unslept,
Afraid the other women will insult
And mock at her; like her Medea wept.

Later Medea lies awake, distracted with remorse for her design to make Jason invulnerable through a magic potion:

Nor yet Medea slept,
Watching for love of Jason, dreading still
The field of Ares, set for grim mischancing
When the great bulls should kill.
Rapid the heart within her bosom leapt,
As troubled as reflected sunbeam glancing
Indoors off water pouring into vat
Or pail,—this way and that
With twist and turn and glitter
Flutters the shining dart:
So in her breast quivered the troubled
heart.

It seems clear that Apollonius in his imagery has traveled paths which Homer did not take. The essential difference is that at crucial moments he has abandoned the world of nature, the realm of timeless truth, in favor of the transitory world of men. The objective

view gives way to the subjective; we move now within the dimensions of the mind, guided by symbolism. The darting beam of sunlight makes an effective symbol, but it cannot be elaborated meaningfully, as in Homer. Thus Apollonius speaks of "a vat, or perhaps a pail,"¹⁶ and this is fatal—not, of course, because the references are prosaic (that would not matter), but because their double presence betrays the poet's inability to develop his comparison. Vergil re-worked this particular simile more successfully, yet he too includes an alternative (the beam is one of sunlight or moonlight), one which is undeniably effective, but effective for reasons wholly outside the comparison itself.¹⁷

Again, the earlier simile of a bride mourning her dead betrothed creates a situation much more complex than Medea's actual dilemma has yet appeared to be. It is psychologically valid because it represents something subjectively real, namely the terrifying fantasy born of Medea's imagination. This gain, however, has been at the expense of objective power: the image has no universality, and consequently must gain its effect by a means quite different from the Homeric technique.

Here we must add that literary categories inevitably falsify. There are exquisite nature similes in Apollonius, and by the same token there are a few similes in Homer which deal predominantly or even exclusively with the world of men. Granting this, one still is justified in basing a judgment on what the critical consensus has again and again found most striking and most representative. The nature simile in Apollonius, moreover, could not easily be confused with its predecessor—the reader might instead fancy himself in the world of 19th-century Romanticism; and comparisons ignoring nature are not only unusual in Homer but are sometimes harder to understand than his normal practice.

Nevertheless, we must be on our guard against the claim that a given attitude *cannot* be found in some author

or composer or artist because it supposedly has no place in the spirit of his culture. This kind of absolutism is a *mystique* which succeeds in maintaining existence only by ignoring the facts. Thus in the *Iliad* Hera speeds toward Olympus as swiftly as the darting mind of a far-traveled man who thinks with longing of the lands he has visited, and in the *Odyssey* the Phaeacian ships are said to be as swift as thought.¹⁸ Here, and a very few times elsewhere, Homeric simile deliberately enters the sphere of the human mind. The point of difference from Apollonius is that Homer does not seek to *reveal* the mind; instead, he uses its inward motion to portray actual motion in space.

Though it is agreed that Apollonius Rhodius largely failed in his attempt at epic, he had a pupil on whom judgment cannot be rendered so easily. This pupil lived two centuries later, but he went to school with Apollonius as zealously as if he had sat at the Rhodian's very feet. He learned much, as he had learned much from Homer; and out of his study and thought came the greatest of all literary epics, the *Aeneid*.

You will object that Vergil's achievement was not merely derivative. Of course it was not;¹⁹ and we shall be likely to see the distinctive quality of his similes precisely by choosing for examination those which are not borrowed from his predecessors. The brevity of the present survey leaves time for quoting only two, selected from the earlier books.²⁰

After Neptune has given Eurys and Zephyrus the rough edge of his tongue for the storm which they and their fellow winds stirred up, he restores peace to the Mediterranean. Here is Vergil's famous comparison:

Just as so often it happens, when a crowd
collects, and violence
Brews up, and the mass mind boils nastily
over, and the next thing
Firebrands and brickbats are flying (hysteria soon finds a missile),
That then, if they see some man whose
goodness of heart and conduct

Have won their respect, they fall silent
and stand still, ready to hear him;
And he can change their temper and calm
their thoughts with a speech:
So now the crash of the seas died down,
when Neptune gazed forth
Over their face, and the sky cleared. . . .

As we know, the storm does not prevent conscientious Aeneas from reaching Carthage and seducing its queen. His *pietas* inevitably makes him renounce her; and with the furious words of a woman scorned still ringing in his ears he goes down to his fleet, where the Trojans are already busied in carrying out his sailing orders. Vergil now describes the scene on the shore:

You could see them on the move, hurrying
out of the city.
It looked like an army of ants when, provident
for winter,
They're looting a great big corn-heap and
storing it up in their own house;
Over a field the black file goes, as they
carry the loot
On a narrow track through the grass; some
are strenuously pushing
The enormous grains of corn with their
shoulders, while others marshal
The traffic and keep it moving: their whole
road seethes with activity.
Ah, Dido, what did you feel when you saw
these things going forward?
What means you gave when, looking forth
from your high roof-top,
You beheld the whole length of the beach
aswarm with men, and the sea's face
Alive with the sound and fury of preparations
for sailing!

Very well: what fault could anyone find with these two examples? Are they not vivid, apt, beautifully expressed? Let us at once admit that they have excellences: we must mourn, nevertheless, for the Homeric power that is gone forever. We need also to make explicit what has already been hinted at, namely that the sources of Homer's power in the use of simile are chiefly his universality and his objectivity. Judged by these canons, Vergilian technique begins to seem at times less than perfect.

Our first example compared the mighty god of ocean to an unidentified

Roman aristocrat capable of quieting an angry mob; some conjecture that Vergil had the elder Cato in mind. Such particularizing stands at a far remove from universality, and in the present instance it is not even apt, for all the mastery of language. Unfortunately this does not represent the extreme of Vergil's use of the particular in simile. Later he compares the fall of a huge warrior slain by Turnus to a pile of masonry crashing into the sea at Baiae, with two further place-names and a mythological allusion added for good measure. Such narrow localization, an artistic weakness in any writer, never occurs in Homer; his comparisons are very rarely localized in even the least degree, and there is a like absence of mythologizing.

Let us proceed to the simile of the ants working like Trojans. These lines, says T. E. Page (*ad loc.*), "are worthy of the *Georgics* and exhibit all their quiet humour, observation, and subtle felicity of expression." No one, surely, will fail to concur, though Page's first words may remind us that the very beautiful bee simile of Book 1 was taken bodily from the *Georgics*. What then is the un-Homeric feature of Vergil's workmanship here?

It is simply the quality of subjectivity, basically the same quality we have already seen in Apollonius' psychological comparison. *Cernas*, says Vergil: "One could see them," "One could make them out." But is this really the impersonal second singular? Indeed no: we are viewing this scene through Dido's eyes. Vergil makes this unmistakably clear the moment his actual comparison is completed.

Note, however, that he does wait until that moment. The point has importance, for it demonstrates Vergil's eclipse of Apollonius. By delaying the explicitly subjective material, he can begin with what seems to be a perfectly objective simile; only the single word *cernas* hints at the truth. Such sureness of touch permits the great artist to make the best of both worlds, while the lesser artist such as Apollonius

chooses the wrong materials and bungles the job. Here in Vergil we see a moment of brilliant transition between the two worlds of outward and inward experience. When that transition is accomplished the classical simile will be a dead form, for the inner world is the kingdom of metaphor.

We have endeavored to show that the epic simile changed after its first appearance in Homer. We have suggested that this change may be observed most strikingly by concentrating on the basic characteristics of Homeric simile, defined earlier as universality and objectivity—that "objectivity of the unchanging background" which Mr. C. S. Lewis calls "the glory of Homer's poetry," and which he finds embodied in it to "a degree . . . no other poetry has ever surpassed."²¹ We have seen how in Apollonius and Vergil the balance began to swing from the universal towards the particularized, from the objective towards the subjective.

What we have not yet accomplished is a full defense of the theory of simile as identity. This has indeed hardly been possible, because the proofs can only be established with real vividness by a use of contrast. Apollonius and Vergil imitate Homer too closely to be of service here; what the situation requires is an epic poet possessed of skill and elevated genius comparable with Homer's, yet under the necessity of applying them to quite different problems. Such a poet is John Milton, whose relationship to Homer in the use of simile will be discussed in the second part of this study.

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NOTES

¹ Her. 4. 45. 59. Apparently Cicero is rendering the essential portion of Aristotle's definition of *metaphorê* (Poet. 1457b7; see also below, note 9). Throughout this section of the treatise to Herennius his treatment derives from the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.

² See A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1951) under *similis* and *unus*. The editors state that *unus*, as designating unity, supplanted the root **sem-*. See also T. G. Tucker, *A Concise Etymological Dictionary of Latin* (Halle, 1931) under *similis* and *semper*. In a minority opinion,

Professor Tucker conjectures that *similis* was crossed in formation by a root **sim-*, becoming **sei-*, and meaning "blind, unite."

³ This supersedes Bassett's article, "The Function of the Homeric Simile," *TAPhA* 52 (1921) 132-47.

⁴ *Die Gleichnisse Homers und die Bildkunst seiner Zeit* (Tübingen, 1932).

⁵ See below, note 14.

⁶ Arguing against Sir Gilbert Murray's theory of purple patches, W. P. Shephard ("Traces of the Rhapsode," *JHS* 42 [1922] 220-37) shows that the similes of the *Iliad* are rarely isolated, and that they form series adapted to the general structure of the poem.

⁷ J. A. Notopoulos, "Homeric Similes in the Light of Oral Poetry," *CJ* 52 (1957) 323-28, esp. 327. In the course of his article—actually a long review of Dimitrios Petropoulos, *La comparaison dans la chanson populaire grecque* (Athens, 1954)—one finds the claim (p. 324) that "Homer uses the simile to describe objective situations at moments of strife, rarely [italics mine] to express human emotions." Perhaps we had all better re-read the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

⁸ J. W. Mackail, *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, 2nd ed. (London, 1911) p. 67.

⁹ *Rhet.* 1406b20, 25 f. The identity is restated *ib.* 1410b17 f. Aristotle uses *metaphorê* to include both metaphor, as such, and simile (*eikôn*).

¹⁰ *Il.* 1. 359. Compare the frequent arrivals or departures of Athena in the form of a bird, and Achilles springing at the enemy "like a lion" (*Il.* 20. 164).

¹¹ E. G. Wilkins, "The Classification of the Similes in Homer," *CW* 13 (1919) 147-50, 154-59, gives the following statistics for (1) developed and (2) brief similes in Homer: *Iliad*, (1) 218, (2) 124; *Odyssey*, (1) 53, (2) 76. On the predominance of similes in the *Iliad*, see J. A. Scott, "Similes in Homer and in Virgil," *CJ* 13 (1918) 687.

¹² Neither Otto Schroeder's extreme view that Homeric epic is an amplification of ballads nor Bassett's more moderate position has been favored by more recent German scholars.

¹³ *Von Homers Welt und Werk. Aufsätze und Auslegungen zur Homerischen Frage* (Stuttgart, copyright 1944). Both Schadewaldt and Hampe (above, note 4) draw upon H. Fränkel's *Die Homerischen Gleichnisse* (Göttingen, 1921).

¹⁴ Paul Shorey ("The Logic of the Homeric Simile," *CP* 17 [1922] 240-59) believed the similes corresponded (1) in form to the so-called geometrical style, and (2) in idea to the realism, of Mycenaean art. For a recent treatment of the problem, see the second half of Hampe's work (above, note 4). In *Eigenart der Griechen* (Freiburg, 1949) pp. 41 f., R. Harder develops an extreme theory of the Homeric simile as abstract in the highest degree; Hampe (pp. 13 f.) deplores his extremism and convincingly refutes it, though Schadewaldt (p. 149) actually seems to give his approval. The latter's comments (*ib.*) on the *lógos* of the simile are most emphatic: for him its details, so often misunderstood (e.g. as poetic embroidery), constitute a highly precise logical process.

¹⁵ *Ap. Rh.* 3. 651-64, 751-60, tr. George Allen.

¹⁶ Here I have translated literally, to show the degree of weakness.

¹⁷ *Aen.* 8. 22-25. James Whaler ("The Miltonic Simile," *PMLA* 46 [1931] 1068, note 27) supposes Vergil's alternatives suggest "that Aeneas' anguish and perplexity held through from day into night." The point is rather that the sole . . . out radiantis imagine lunae in 22 cleverly anticipates the transition to night (*noct erat* . . .) in 26.

¹⁸ *Il.* 15. 80-83; *Od.* 7. 36.

¹⁹ See R. B. Steele, "The Similes in Latin Epic Poetry," *TAPhA* 49 (1918) 83-100, esp. 93 and 100.

²⁰ *Aen.* 1. 148-56; 4. 401-11, tr. Cecil Day Lewis.

²¹ C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost* (London, 1942) pp. 24 f. Chapters III to VI of this brief work, which deal primarily with Homer and Vergil, are invaluable for the classicist.

Rome Prize Fellowships for 1958-59

The American Academy in Rome is again offering fellowships for mature students and artists capable of doing independent work in architecture, landscape architecture, musical composition, painting, sculpture, history of art, and classical studies.

Fellowships are open to citizens of the United States for one year beginning October 1, 1958, with a possibility of renewal. The Academy favors a two-year fellowship. Though there is no age limit, the Academy aims to give the awards to young persons of outstanding promise, when such candidates apply. The fellowships carry a stipend of \$1,250 a year, round-trip transportation between New York and Rome, studio space, residence at the Academy, and an additional travel allowance. Special research fellowships, offered only in classical studies and art history, carry a stipend of \$2,500 a year and residence at the Academy.

Applications and submissions of work, in the form prescribed, must be received at the Academy's New York office by December 31, 1957. Requests for details should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, American Academy in Rome, 101 Park Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

American Numismatic Society Summer Seminar

Ten students from seven universities attended the sixth Summer Seminar in Numismatics held in the Society's Museum in New York from June 18 to August 24, 1957. The fields of study represented by the students were: Classics, 4; ancient history, 2; classical archeology, 1; medieval history, 1; modern languages, 1; oriental languages, 1.

The program included background reading on coins, attendance at fifteen conferences conducted by specialists in selected fields, preparation by each student of a paper on a topic of his own selection. Most of the conferences were concerned with specific problems in ancient and medieval history and art, toward the solution of which numismatics makes a definite contribution. In the closing week of the Seminar each student conducted a conference on his own topic of investigation.

The Seminar will be repeated in the summer of 1958, and the Society will again offer grants-in-aid to students who will have completed at least one year's graduate study by June 1958, in archeology, Classics, economics, history, history of art, oriental languages, and other humanistic fields. This offer is restricted to students or junior instructors at universities in the United States and Canada. Further information and application forms may be obtained from the office of the Society, Broadway between 155th and 156th Streets, New York 32, New York. Completed applications for the grants must be filed by March 1, 1958.

BOOK REVIEWS

FRED W. HOUSEHOLDER, JR., EDITOR

FOR TEACHING LATIN POETRY

A Running Vocabulary to the Odes of Horace — Book II — Book III — Book IV. By LEO M. KAISER. Chicago: Office of the Graduate School, Loyola University, 1956. Mimeographed. Pp. 36, 68, 40. Each \$.50 plus postage.

A Running Vocabulary to Juvenal—Satires I, 3, 7, 10, 11. By LEO M. KAISER. Chicago: Office of the Graduate School, Loyola University, 1957. Mimeographed. Pp. 69, unnumbered. \$.75 plus postage.

Selections from Tibullus (I. 1, 3, 5, 10; II. 1, 2, 4, 6; IV. 13). Edited with notes and visible vocabularies by LEO M. KAISER. Chicago: Office of the Graduate School, Loyola University, 1957. Mimeographed. Pp. 69. \$.85 plus postage.

STUDENTS AND TEACHERS of intermediate Latin will applaud the availability of Mr. Kaiser's useful running vocabularies. These are set up in double vertical columns of legibly clear pica type. Ample white space enables the student to fill in unlisted words which may give him trouble. The vocabularies do not list every word in every line or stanza, but they will certainly "enable the student . . . to read . . . with something like rapidity." For the first stanza of Horace 3. 6, by way of example, only *donec*, *-que*, and *deus* are not defined. The definitions are generally limited to one well-chosen word. Latin vowels are not marked for quantity. The Juvenal vocabularies include some bibliographical notes and short summaries of the respective satires.

The Tibullus selections, covering both sides of each 8x11 page, are accurately and ideally arranged: on the left there is a double-spaced text with line numbers and unambiguous footnotes; on the right, a single-spaced column of running vocabulary. Teachers who do not discourage their students' provision of personal interlinear translations will welcome the workbook air of this edition.

The typing is impeccable throughout; and the duplication is good, although there are, inevitably, a few blurred pages.

Mr. Kaiser's work merits examination and adoption where possible. It is good

pedagogy. Perhaps it will encourage others to provide their students with sensibly operable texts and vocabularies as the need arises.

ROY ARTHUR SWANSON

Indiana University

God and Fate in Livy. By IIRO KAJANTO. (Annales Universitatis Turkuensis B. 64). Turku: Turun Yliopiston Kustantama, 1957. Pp. 115. 400 Finnish marks.

THIS IS A COMPETENT and well-printed dissertation of the University of Abo (Turku), and in very respectable English except for such unintentional colloquialisms as "A lot of different things can be meant by the word *fortuna* in Livy." Its avowed purpose is to determine to what extent Livy believed that "irrational factors, the gods and fate (*fatum*, *fortuna*), had shaped Roman history" (p. 10). The conclusion that Livy was basically sceptical of the ordinary expressions which might suggest religious belief can come as no surprise to anyone who remembers Livy's own *Praefatio*, but it is nevertheless well to have an analysis of his use of *fatum* and *fortuna* in various contexts, with reference to antecedent Latin usage and the influence of Greek and especially Hellenistic ideas.

In making his analysis the author does well to distinguish between narrative passages and speeches. In the former, *fatum* and *fortuna* occur more rarely, and preponderantly in the early books. Their use is mainly rhetorical or as an adjunct to some rationalist motivation ("With the help of God and ten policemen," as the song about Nelly has it), or with some exonerating expression like *traditur*; where independent parallels are available (mainly in Dionysius of Halicarnassus) we can see that external motivation had indeed been invoked in Livy's source. The use of these words in speeches is more frequent, and though these too are mainly Livy's own compositions he was here concerned for rhetorical devices to make arguments effective and for the antiquarianism which was part of the Augustan program. Prodiges are numerous because Livy like other historians used the religious calendars which recorded them, but again he is apt to discount them as having been

motivated by war-fever or simply as shams.

The one exception which Kajanto notes (but little more) is the seriousness with which Livy takes *fatum* in connection with the founding of Rome and the grand role in history foretold for it. Here he remarks on the parallel to Vergil, but cannot believe that Vergil can have affected Livy. It is here that Kajanto commits his major fault of omission. The doctrine that Rome was foreordained and predestined to its grand role is a central belief in Livy, and his prime motive for writing his history was to propagate this belief. Vergil too, though we know that his early convictions were Epicurean, devoted his major work to the same objective, and Horace, who confesses his Epicureanism, grows somber and reverent when he touches on Rome's mission. Surely the belief as expressed in all three authors was a calculated part of Augustus' program, and though its inception may have been disingenuous it was embraced apparently no less wholeheartedly by Livy than by Vergil. To write what must be taken as an account of Livy's attitude to the supernatural (though, to be sure, Kajanto does not profess to do so) without stressing this concept is therefore a little like describing a Christian in terms of sending Christmas cards and saying *Gesundheit* without mentioning such words as grace and salvation.

MOSES HADAS

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Roemische Geisteswelt. By FRIEDRICH KLINGNER. Munich: Verlag H. Rinn, 1956. Pp. 693. DM 18.

THE TWENTY-SEVEN ESSAYS presented in this volume, most of them published in—not always easily accessible—German philosophical journals, offer a comprehensive view of the Roman genius and character as expressed in literature and poetry. Some of the articles deal with the analysis of a particular work such as some selected specimens of Augustan poetry; most of them discuss the cultural and historical background of Roman literature, basic concepts of Roman thought such as *iustitia* and *humanitas*, and especially the great Roman writers and poets from Cato to Boethius. Thus we get a picture of the constant as well as of the changing features of the Roman mind through seven centuries. Additional essays, such as the one on Pindar's First *Pythian Ode*, illustrate the Hellenic background of Roman poetry,

while others point to the survival of the Roman heritage in the Middle Ages and its renewal by Petrarch, and to the idea of *Roma aeterna* as the major key to the uniqueness of Western tradition. Thus, Klingner's book appears as a counterpart to the work done in the last generation by Latinists such as Heinze and Rand, and the title: *The Founding of Eternal Rome* would be appropriate also to this new book.

Nearly one third of its space belongs to the articles on Virgil and Horace, which combine aesthetic analysis with the picture of the cultural and philosophic foundations of Augustan poetry. Particular emphasis is on the creative transformation of Greek motives into a new and original expression of Roman thought and form—a phenomenon to which some striking parallels exist in the great achievement of Roman portraiture. As the most perfect embodiment of the integration of all the creative forces alive in Rome, reborn after a century of moral crisis and conscious of her ecumenic and imperial mission, we have the three major works of Virgilian genius; and on some of his best pages the author shows both the unity and the growth of Virgil's poetry and personality in the concepts of the beauty of the country, the grandeur of the *imperium sine fine*, and the dignity and tragedy of human existence in general, appearing in ever more profound and perfect form in the *Bucolics*, the *Georgics*, and the *Aeneid*.

There are many fine observations on what we may call the Stoic and the Epicurean ideals as complementary aspects in Augustan poetry. The precursory stages of this climax are illustrated in the essays on Lucretius and Catullus, and on poetry in the Roman republic in general. There has never been any doubt that the Rome of the statesmen, soldiers, and lawgivers has found its most congenial expression in the unsurpassed grandeur of Latin prose. Accordingly, Klingner presents four great types of the Roman character in his analyses of the personality and work of Cato and Cicero, Livy and Tacitus—to whom one wishes he may add, in a later edition, Caesar and Seneca. Historiography, one of the major themes of a nation so deeply concerned with *res publica* and *imperium*, is also discussed in a special chapter; and the essays on Livy and Tacitus, who seem to embody widely divergent approaches to the Roman past and present, do justice to both as outstanding representatives of the concept of Rome demanded by their age and personal background. The author stresses how much the

standards of nineteenth-century *Quellenkunde* and scholarly research were out of focus when applied to the dignified idealism of the unpolitical provincial of the *pax Augusta*, Livy, or to the disillusioned bitterness of Tacitus, who, experienced in the political and imperial traditions, is aware of the gulf between the *exempla* of Roman *virtus* and the realities of the imperial present as well as the republican past. Finally, Prof. Klingner deals with the last stage of Rome's decline, or rather transformation, in the twilight between paganism and Christianity, as this appears in the background and work of Ammianus, Claudian, Macrobius, Augustine, Prudentius, and Boethius.

FELIX M. WASSERMANN

Kansas Wesleyan University

Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education. By DONALD LEMEN CLARK. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 285, frontispiece. \$4.50.

THIS THOROUGHLY practical and sensible book is introduced by its author in the opening words of the Preface as a "book about teaching . . . written primarily for teachers." Professor Clark has enjoyed a long and distinguished career as a teacher of English and is now Professor of Rhetoric Emeritus at Columbia University. He wrote the book—and he obviously enjoyed writing it immensely—in order to point out to other teachers of English the interest and practical value that present-day teachers may find in the study of the ancient theory and teaching of rhetoric, using that term, of course, in its best and broadest sense. The book is not intended for the use of classical scholars, but it is one with which they should be well acquainted, for it presents a very important element of classical civilization to persons who do not themselves read the ancient languages and are not primarily concerned with the study of classical literature as such. The book will be welcome to both the classicist and the teacher of English composition, creative writing, and public speaking; it fills a real need and it ought to render valuable help to students of antiquity in their efforts to show the value of their subject for present-day needs. Professor Clark writes, not as an apologist for the study of the Classics, but as a teacher and practitioner of a basic educational discipline which is as important now as it was in classical antiquity. There is a great opportunity for a book of this

kind just now when there seems to be a growing sense that the teaching of English composition, as it is now practised, might be improved.

The Greek and Roman educational system can be studied under the different aspects of the literature it produced, the human beings it developed, and, ultimately, the effect of this education, through its products, on the history of the ancient world. This educational system is so closely dependent upon rhetoric—using the term always in its largest and best sense—that an accurate and sympathetic study of the ancient teaching of rhetoric will provide us with one of the major keys to Greek and Roman antiquity. Professor Clark, drawing on the scholarly study and practical experience of many years, has brought together in a relatively brief compass a comprehensive view of what it was that the ancient theorists and practitioners saw in rhetoric and what they believed they gained by giving it a central place in their training. The ancient definitions and descriptions are presented in full quotations of the ancient writers, so that the reader has before him, as far as possible, the ancient writers' own words, in English translation (often Professor Clark's renderings). There is an excellent bibliography of primary sources, Greek and Latin, in translation, and of secondary works which will suggest lines of further study. The distinguished names and works listed in this bibliography reflect the importance which some of the best teachers and practitioners have seen in the subject.

One of the most valuable, as well as delightful, features of the book is the author's personal comment—always pertinent, not seldom picturesque—on such features of teaching, ancient and modern, as he feels moved to illuminate from his own experience. Indeed a major purpose of the book (p. ix) is to make available to younger teachers something of what Professor Clark himself has learned. Everywhere Professor Clark writes from a utilitarian point of view and in a plain straightforward manner which is itself an illustration of his claim that modern training can profit from studying and adapting the best features of the ancient system.

The classical scholar is familiar with the subject matter, and a review in a classical periodical does not need to describe the material which Professor Clark brings together. The distinctive character of the book is that the ancient texts are here organized around the purposes and processes of the schools, and are presented from

the point of view of the ancient teachers, though Professor Clark always writes with the modern curriculum and present-day needs in mind. We are enabled to follow the way in which the student was made familiar with the accepted standards of good speaking and writing, how the study and imitation of the methods of successful speakers and writers was approached from an entirely utilitarian point of view, and how the student was taught to carry out various types of carefully planned exercises, both spoken and written. We are shown all the ways in which the teacher trained the student to evaluate and criticize his subject and to discover the material pertinent to it, and then how to put it in correct language which was appropriate for presenting the theme, or argument, either orally or in writing, to a given audience with its special characteristics and requirements. There was some controversy in antiquity—as Professor Clark notes—over some of the methods involved, and the dangers of over-embellishment were well recognized, as well as the very serious risks of confusing rhetoric and truth; but the system as a whole was never seriously questioned, and, once established, it was never changed, for the results were for the most part looked upon as satisfactory.

A major purpose of the book is to show the real potentialities of the rhetorical training in the larger framework of the liberal arts program. The ancient teachers and literary critics by long observation and practice worked out a very subtle and also practical understanding of rhetoric as a means of intellectual expression; and likewise, led by Isocrates, they envisaged "education in rhetoric as the training of young people to take their place in a human society where all transactions are conducted through the medium of language" (p. 58).

As the author points out (p. 54), much of what we still use of the ancient heritage in rhetoric is now taught in different faculties or departments, as humanities, philosophy and political science. This is perhaps an inevitable development, but as Professor Clark observes, the result is a dilution and a loss of identity; "when taught separately as descriptive sciences such studies as ethics, politics, logic and literature may become just something to know. When properly integrated with rhetoric as Isocrates saw the matter, they are more likely to find useful application to private or public affairs" (p. 55). In antiquity, "the same teacher, whether in grammar school or school of rhetoric, who taught the arts of speaking and writing,

also read great poems, histories and public addresses of earlier ages with the boys" (p. 263). The result, of course, was that the students were given a comprehensive and balanced view of the whole subject of style and expression, which they learned how to organize.

We must also, as Professor Clark goes on to point out (p. 264), remember that the Greeks and Romans looked upon the teaching of the arts of speaking and writing as an instrument for the teaching of morality. Of course training in rhetoric cannot alone impart the virtues, but it was taken for granted that this could and should be one of the effects of the training.

This is a book which will fill an important place and can render a great service. The author's pleasure in writing it will be increased by the sincere appreciation of his colleagues.

There is a delightful frontispiece, a reproduction of a woodcut from the mediaeval encyclopaedia *Margarita philosophica* (1504) showing an allegory of Lady Rhetoric, represented with the traditional attributes illustrating her function.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY

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Horaz und die Politik. By VIKTOR POESCHL.
Heidelberg: C. Winter Universitätsverlag,
1956. Pp. 29. DM 5.80.

ONE OF THE MOST fascinating topics of Roman studies, the coexistence and interrelation of the public and the private spheres, is the subject of Pöschl's treatise on *Horace and Politics*. As the author proves in this scholarly and lively essay, Horace's political poetry, though reflecting the poet's growth and his change of emphasis, by no means presents a conversion from the "Epicurean" irresponsibility of the earlier years to the public and political virtues of "Roman Stoicism." The objective sincerity of the passages praising Augustus and his regime is judged with insight into the nature of political poetry not meant to be the personal confession of *Erlebnisdichtung*; and this praise is balanced by the reserve of an emphatically independent mind in his dealings with Augustus and Maecenas. Even that embodiment of Augustan glory, the Roman Odes, presents a warning of the dangers of power and asserts the rights of a private existence. Throughout the work of Horace the concern of poetry is to express both the tensions and the concurrence of the two sides of Roman life, *res publica* and *otium*; and Horace voices the feelings of many of his Roman contemporaries when behind the grandeur of Rome he exalts the simple and unpretentious serenity of the *vallis Sabina*.

FELIX M. WASSERMANN
Kansas Wesleyan University

Ovid, The Art of Love. Translated by ROLFE HUMPHRIES. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957. Pp. 206. \$3.75 (cloth). \$1.45 (paper).

THE TITLE of Mr. Humphries' version of Ovid's amatory poems is slightly misleading; the reader gets more for his money than he may think, for included under the title *The Art of Love* are the *Amores*, *Medicamina Faciei*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris*. Much as I commend and recommend the job he has done, one must confess at the outset that Mr. Humphries' version lies on the borderline between translation and imitation; and if there is a major defect in the work it is that Mr. Humphries has not quite made up his mind which he intends it to be. In his Introduction, which contains some glancingly fine insights (e.g. that the closest thing to Ovid in English

is not Pope or Congreve, but Chaucer), Mr. Humphries touches on this problem (p. 6): "Ovid is much more even than we can be, his tone much more all of a piece, his conventions more consistent; one likes to suppose that, were he among us today, he would be responsive and adaptable enough to draw on whatever resource was offered, picking up whatever seemed lively, not only from the bright salon, but from stage and screen, not only from the purlieus of Bohemia, but from the slickness and sleekness of the advertising pages. So that, while violence may here have been done his letter, we have not, we hope, offended against his spirit." The assumption in the phrase "one likes to suppose" has been carried over into the translation, with what success I shall try to illustrate and analyze. The reader who turns to *Amores* 1. finds the following opening lines:

Arma gravi numero violentaque bella para-
bam
edere, materia conveniente modis:
par erat inferior versus. risisse Cupido
dicitur atque unum surripuisse pedem.

Mr. Humphries translates:

Arms and violent wars, with meter suited
to matter,
Arms and violent wars, all in hexameters,
I was preparing to sound, when I heard
snicker from Cupid;
What had the rascal done, but taken one
foot away?

No one can quarrel seriously with this, except perhaps on the matter of meter, which I shall discuss later. If "rascal" is not in the Latin explicitly, it is suggested in *surripuisse*: and "taken away" is weakened to compensate for the addition. What Mr. Humphries has added is the word "hexameters," and it is just at this point that his whole problem of letter versus spirit arises. ("Hexameters" is a word which Mr. Humphries uses often; and never, I think, with metrical ease.) What audience does Mr. Humphries have in mind? To readers unfamiliar with Latin metrics the joke is lost; to the initiate the word "hexameters" is unnecessary. Had heroic couplets been chosen as the medium, perhaps a translation could be made which would appeal to both classes of readers:

Arms and the war I was prepared to sing,
In epic manner for an epic thing,
When Cupid, mocking my heroic meter,
Added some rhymes and made my Muse
much feater.

This transposition of allusions is at once comprehensible to a Latinless reader; while the classicist can derive an extra fillip of pleasure from seeing that the Muse becomes more feat by having less feet. Mr. Humphries, however, has chosen to use a modified version of Ovid's elegiac couplet; and this places a double burden on the non-classical reader.

At the other extreme we may cite *Ars Am.* 1. 5-8:

curribus Automedon lentisque erat aptus
habenis,

Tiphys in Haemonia puppe magister erat:
me Venus artificem tenero praefecit Amori;
Tiphys et Automedon dicar Amoris ego.

Automedon excelled with the reins in the
car of Achilles,

Tiphys in Jason's craft, crafty with
rudder and sail;

Thanks be to Venus, I too deserve the title
of master,

Master of Arts, I might say, versed in
the precepts of love.

Here the whole point of the lines lies in the repetition of the names Automedon and Tiphys (Jason for *Haemonia* is a legitimate simplification). Yet apparently Mr. Humphries decided that the names would not carry much meaning for a non-classical reader, and so he has adapted freely; in short, he has imitated the effect rather than the meaning. If he has omitted, however, he has also tried to compensate. "Jason's craft, crafty" and "title of master, Master of Arts" are what Spenser's E.K. would call "a pretty Epanorthosis in these two verses; and withal a Paronomasia or playing with the word."

The problem faces every translator: shall I adapt for the modern sensibility or try to say what the original says without interpretation? Mr. Humphries on p. 7 of the Introduction says that he kept the fulsome praise of Caesar (in *Ars Am.* 1. 177-216) because "it is not the translator's responsibility, under these circumstances, to edit or anthologize his subject." Yet on p. 8 he remarks that where Ovid "has supported an argument with illustrations that would involve the reader in meaningless allusion and an excess of proper names, I have sometimes cut a bit." This would seem to account for the omission of *Haemonia* in the passage just above; but why put Automedon and Tiphys in only once? Either twice or not at all. These two passages, written without apparent consciousness of each other, describe the conflict of methods which I have tried to illustrate by quotations.

Apart from this problem, which no translator has ever solved, Mr. Humphries' version is really good: bright, crisp, clever, and deft. The only other grounds I can see on which to quarrel with him are metrical ones. There are some who just do not like any attempt to use classical meters in English; and in so far as such attempts are quantitative rather than accentual, I agree. Quantitative meters in English are at best a *tour de force* and can be sustained but briefly. I must warn the reader, however, that I have always liked *Evangeline*; and I believe that there is a place in our literature for the accentual hexameter. Up until Mr. Humphries' translation I did not feel that anyone had mastered, or even could master, an accentual elegiac couplet. But Mr. Humphries has done just that. Take, for example, *Ars Am.* 3. 687-94, the beginning of the Cephalus-Procris story. Here is Ovid in his most liquid, musical mode. See how beautifully Mr. Humphries renders him:

Near the blue hills of Hymettus, whose
flowers are always in blossom,

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VAN NOSTRAND

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There is a sacred spring, turf eternally green.

Trees of no great height make a grove, and a carpet of berries

Crimsons the grass; you can find rosemary, myrtle, and bay.

Thick-leaved boxwood is there, and the tamarisks, fragile and swaying,

Tender lucerne and the pine, tended with delicate care.

Breezes come wandering there, and the air is always in motion,

Leaves rustle over your head, the tips of the grasses bend.

Notice the delicacy of diction, enhanced by the subtle use of assonance ("turf-eternally" or "tender-tended") and by internal rhyme ("there-air"); the variation of caesuras is perfect.

At the other extreme Mr. Humphries can use his English elegiac just as well for colloquial passages: e.g. *Ars Am.* 2. 273-78, the famous *aurea sunt vere nunc saecula*.

What about sending her poems? A very difficult question.

Poems, I am sorry to say, aren't worth so much in this town.

Oh, they are praised, to be sure; but the girls want something more costly.

Even illiterates please, if they have money to burn.

Our is a Golden Age, and gold can purchase you honors,

All the "Golden Mean" means is, gold is the end.

If the rhythm and caesuras are somewhat less musical here, we must allow for the difference in tone.

Of course, the meter is not completely natural in English, and sometimes Mr. Humphries, deft as he is, becomes inept: e.g. *Ars Am.* 3. 718:

Now she is glad; her love shifts with each beat of her heart.

Here the caesura conflicts with the grammatical closeness of subject and verb.

On occasion the meter forces the translator into rather formal syntax, with the result that he sounds like bad Longfellow: e.g. *Ars Am.* 1. 349:

In the fields of our neighbor the grass forever is greener.

But such cases are rare, and have very little effect on the total impression of brightness and quickness.

Interestingly enough, Mr. Humphries abandons the English elegiac on occasion for the Shakespearian sonnet, and uses two or three sonnets, a miniature sequence, to translate some of the *Amores*. He does this, as he says in the Introduction (p. 8), for two reasons: "to add an element of variety, and also because, it seems to me, there is a relationship between sonnet and elegy, not only in the proportions, but also in the spirit." The change in form has taken him, as he next admits, "even further away from the letter of Ovid." Thus, in *Amores* 1. 3, where Ovid has (line 6)

accipe qui pura norit amare fide,

Mr. Humphries renders

Take me, who know devotion deep and pure.

The iambic line, so natural in English, conveys the simplicity of the original with more purity and power and grace than would an English elegiac, however skilful. On the other hand, the Ovidian periphrasis of lines 21-24 becomes three bald names in Mr. Humphries: "Europa, Io, Leda." In 13-14 Ovid lists four nouns, each with a *Weltanschauung* of its own; no four English

nouns could, I suppose, ever correspond. Thus, where Ovid has

et nulli cessura fides, sine crimine mores,
nudaque simplicitas purpureusque pudor,

Mr. Humphries renders

a man of modest ways,
Decent behavior, and a faith as true
As you are apt to find in all your days.

This is clear and graceful, but has little of the dignity which is in the Latin; no attempt is made to translate the bold *purpureus pudor*.

One must be grateful to Mr. Humphries for having translated these poems. Ovid, who seems to be having a sort of "boom" lately, is becoming more and more available to both the classicist and the non-classicist, at least with respect to translations and criticism. Both should find this version delightful throughout; and I think, on the whole, that Mr. Humphries has justified his theory that Ovid, were he alive today, might write such English as this. I doubt, though, that he would have chosen the English elegiac. It would be interesting to know what meter he would have chosen as suitable for the twentieth century. Our poets have abandoned so many of the traditional meters.

If I may add a note of prayer here, perhaps one of the results of the Ovid "boom" in translation and criticism will be the issuance of some attractive and adequate Latin texts; and, if it is not too much to pray for, of some good annotated editions.

JOHN CROSSETT

Harvard University

Pindar and Aeschylus. By JOHN H. FINLEY, JR. Martin Classical Lectures, Oberlin College. Harvard University Press, 1955. Pp. 307. \$4.50.

MR. FINLEY'S new book evaluates the two dominant poetic figures of the early fifth century from a deliberately limited thematic viewpoint: symbolic thinking, prelogical response to experience vs. Ionian or "evolutionary" reason, masculine will vs. feminine order, human becoming vs. divine being, the function of myth as a language for otherwise inexpressible states of mind. The book does not pretend to be a full stylistic or interpretative commentary. Particular odes and tragedies are therefore not treated as self-contained achievements of poetic form, but the chosen passages and motifs are expounded

with suggestive insight. Finley's general debt to psychological analysis, especially as modified by Dodds and Snell, is clear, but the manner is unique.

Through a series of fluid juxtapositions, partly in the realm of image but primarily in the realm of "ordering of reality," Finley establishes both poets as practitioners of archaic symbolic thinking, which in Pindar's case drives toward intuition of static divinity, in Aeschylus' toward a reasoned view of time and change. This confirms from a special slant the traditional judgement that Pindar spoke for a homogeneous dying culture, Aeschylus for the new experimenting Athens. The value of the book is not in its conclusions, but in the passing insights which lead to them.

Taken sentence by sentence the book is often brilliant. Finley's gift for phrasing is special, his responses to poetry immediate and suggestive. Yet he often seems dragged along by his own talent for language, not quite in control of it, with two distracting effects: memorable phrases are lumped into incoherent paragraphs, and the poetic prose drains away the poetry from the subject matter. Pindar especially tempts critics to fence him off as private property and respond with competitive style to his intricacies; the shorter Aeschylus section is easier to read. Random samples: "P3 seeks more transparently than any other ode to draw reality into Pindar's imaginative net. He would throw the skein of his verse around the king's life as if by so doing he could hold it" (p. 92). "After the wave of death which sounded through the opening of the poem (N7) the lily flower of coral which the Muse harvests from the sea is poetry's triumph over death. Intuition can hardly be purer" (p. 102). "The giant Porphyryon (P8), by contrast, suggests Bellerophon's ambition and fall in I7, and if his violence differs from Odysseus' scheming of N9 they are at equal remove from Hesychia's peace. It is Apollo who beside Zeus subdues Porphyryon, music and order beside power and majesty, and Orestes returns from Delphi in P11 in much this redeeming spirit" (p. 170). This combination of roaming reference and subjectivity is hard to follow. The prose translations, too, are dense and twisted; one thinks at first that Finley is trying to match the original Greek word order, but this proves false. "Fend in loathing off the lust of men" (*Suppliants* 528), "The meditations of the young circling with toil discover glory. Then shine through time acts lifted up to heaven" (Pindar *frag.* 214).

The difficulty of concentrating on this book does not invalidate particular insights, however. Finley sees Pindar as a lonely alien in Sicily, responding with defiantly coruscating verse. He notes that when Pindar thinks of Hieron "he cannot dispel images of violence." Each ode is a giant metaphor with men and heroes as terms. Pindar's method of composition is not rational, but "a kind of intent waiting" for the precisely illuminating image or myth to form without strain. Recurrent images and transitional tropes are compared to a vase-painter's "pleasing and serviceable" decorative motifs. Finley groups the odes into four thematic types: Vicissitude, Harmony, Attainment, Essence, and relates them deftly to his chosen preoccupations.

With Aeschylus his method is essentially that of intelligent recounting of the plot. Tragedy is viewed especially as a carriage for moral-political philosophy. Characters are reduced somewhat from their real dramatic stature to serve Finley as types of basic conflict. Refreshingly, Prometheus is seen less as pure practical intelligence than as emotional impulsiveness, and the lesson of the trilogy is mastery of the urge

to improve the world without invitation. The *Seven* becomes a curse-haunted study in the tempering of masculine will. *Oresteia* is compared to *The Divine Comedy* with the ultimate paradise converted to civil rather than personal terms, but with achievement through Orestes of harmony between mind and world order.

This approach is obviously limited. Pindar's odes tend to become didactic visions of world order instead of lyric, and Aeschylus' tragedy is partly converted to closet drama. Finley's themes are there, but much more too, and though he acknowledges the public, communicating character of these poetic forms, his analysis of their content would be appreciated better by trained and sensitive mystics than by the Greek audiences for whom Pindar and Aeschylus wrote. Yet granted Finley's feeling for poetry as "the mysterious record of Protean meaning" (p. 236), his documentation of the underlying states of mind which produced both choral lyric and tragedy will be found full of perceptive suggestion.

EMILY TOWNSEND VERMEULE
Wellesley College

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